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Introduction  
 
The geography vs. history dilemma has been a stable element in the 
Australian mindset since the beginning of the federation (1900). It refers to 
Australia’s origins as a British dominion in an Asian-dominated region of the 
globe or, as P. Kelly put it, “a museum to a bizarre incident – European 
shipwrecked on the wrong side of the earth” (2002: 2). Historically, Australia 
has been both in and out of Asia. On the one hand it is a continent per se, 
the only continental mass occupied by a single country; yet territory does not 
necessarily correlate with population and compared with its ‘crowded’ Asian 
neighbors Australia remains somewhat insignificant. On the other hand its 
security, indeed its very existence, has always been perceived as contingent 
on what goes on in ‘the region to the north’ (Gary and Lowe, 2005). 
Distance, wrote Blainey (1968 apud Parent, 2005: 2) “is as characteristic of 
Australia as mountains are of Switzerland”.   
 
For the most part, this has been perceived as a problem for which there is no 
definitive solution. More recently, however, Australian governments have 
tried to move beyond this seemingly inescapable binary opposition. Prime 
minister Paul Keating1, along with foreign affairs minister Gareth Evans, had 
made engagement with Asia one of the main banners of their terms in office. 
                                                            
1 For a quick guide into contemporary Australian politics (including names and dates) see 
attachment 1.  
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Under Keating-Evans there was an explicit attempt to join the heretofore all-
Asian club. Howard himself also tried to move away from what he saw as a 
simplistic formulation of Australian history or, as he would put it, the ‘black 
armband’ view of Australia’s history2. However, he did not endorse the 
previous Labor administration strategy: according to Howard, the Labor 
government may have scored some points in its policy of engaging Asia, but 
any progress on this front was achieved at the expense of Australia’s own 
identity and downplaying Australia’s long-standing alliance with the US. 
 
Despite Howard’s explicit attempt to overcome this constraining logic, it has 
consistently shaped Australia’s defense policy and external relations. 
Accordingly, it has also informed another dualism which emerged on 
Howard’s watch – that which crystallized around the establishment of the 
regional assistance mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Although 
through the years Australian foreign policy has remained remarkably 
consistent and bipartisan, the decision to lead and take responsibility for 
RAMSI represents a revision of the traditional hands off approach towards 
the Pacific island nations.  
                                                            
2 To the prime minister, the challenge for Australia was “to ensure that our history as a 
nation is not written definitively by those who take the view that Australians should 
apologize for most of it. This ‘black armband’ view of our past reflects a belief that most 
Australian history since 1788 has been little more than a disgraceful story of imperialism, 
exploitation, racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination” (Howard apud Bonnell and 
Crotty, 2008: 152). Here Howard presumably refers to Australia’s colonial past (at once 
colony and colonizer), the practice of blackbirding, past and current treatment of indigenous 
Australians (aborigines), the white Australia immigration policy, all of which are widely seen 
as stains in Australia’s record. For more on the government’s revisionist impulses see 
“Australia’s History under Howard, 1996-2007” by Bonnell and Crotty (2008).   
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Like in the Pacific, Howard also gradually introduced some changes in 
Australia’s foreign policy towards Asia, mainly by reprioritizing the U.S. 
alliance and rethinking Australia’s relations with her Asian counterparts. As a 
result, two opposing trends emerged on Howard’s watch: first, a clear 
attempt at integrating with its nearest region, the Pacific, by actively trying 
to shape these countries’ political and economic systems. Second, relations 
with its north and East Asian counterparts suggest a pattern of selective 
cooperation along traditional realist lines.  
 
This dissertation asks how was this dualism worked on the ground and how 
can it be understood theoretically. It posits that the new approach resulted 
from a different perception of threat and of the risks associated with it. 
Canberra’s new interventionism in the South Pacific reflected changes in the 
regional security environment first and foremost: it followed the emergence 
of new intra- and non-state threats. But it was also influenced by changes in 
the global security discourse. Two case studies – East Timor and Solomon 
Islands – illustrate these trends. Changes in Canberra’s relations with its 
neighbors are best understood in the framework of the security-development 
nexus. No such change occurred in Australia’s relations with its Northeast 
Asian neighbors because the nature of the threat remained the same – 
conventional and inter-state. Accordingly, Canberra’s approach towards this 
region was consistent with a hard line view of international politics, 
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suggesting that Australian foreign policy under Howard-Downer was by and 
large informed by realist beliefs. To establish this, I review Australia’s 
relationships with a number of key countries - US, China, and Japan. 
 
What changes then, and what elicits a different policy reaction, is the 
perceived nature of the threat to Australia’s security. The independent 
variables are the two kinds of threats abovementioned, while Australia’s 
policy responses differ according to each of them.    
 
The text proceeds as follows: Part 1 lays down the theoretical framework 
which informs the subsequent sections. Part 2 provides an overview of 
Australia’s relations with the Pacific, focusing on two particular countries – 
Solomon Islands and East Timor. For each of the case studies it asks why 
and how: on what grounds did Australia develop a new approach towards its 
neighboring states (justification) and which shape did it take 
(implementation). To set up the case studies, Part 2 first considers 
commonalities: which common themes run through the discourse of the 
relevant Australian authorities? Why did direct foreign intervention become 
acceptable when previously it was not? Part 3 zooms in on North Asia, 
exploring Australia’s relations with the US, China, and to a lesser extent 
Japan. Finally, Part 4 ties everything together. 
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Part 1:  Looking for theory in Australian foreign policy3  
 
This chapter lays down the theoretical basis for the ensuing sections. It 
starts by reviewing the two contemporary mainstream approaches in 
international relations theory – neorealism and neoliberalism. Next, particular 
emphasis is accorded to how current statebuilding efforts link with the latter. 
Finally, it considers an alternative, critical view by referring to Mark Duffield’s 
ideas on the merging of development and security.  
 
Neorealism differs from its predecessor – realism – in that it places anarchy, 
as opposed to human nature, at the centre of the international system. For 
classical realists, human nature is inexorably flawed and it cannot change or 
be changed. Defined as such, human nature is what determines state 
behavior in the international realm and so internationally states behave as 
individuals would. For neorealists, however, it is anarchy that determines 
state behavior. Domestically, individuals may choose to give up on some 
freedoms in exchange for protection and order – the essence of the social 
contract. Internationally, though, there is no higher authority to regulate 
state behavior and no state is able to control the international monopoly over 
the use of force - the very essence of anarchy. As a result, states are left 
with no other choice than to try to survive and prosper in a competitive, self-
                                                            
3 Borrowed from Dalrymple, 2003.  
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help system which inescapably places them against each other. Thus, the 
international anarchic system is independent from the units which it is 
composed of – states. State behavior is determined by the system’s anarchic 
condition (not by some innate human penchant for evil) while the opposite 
does not hold true (Cravinho, 2002: 199-206).  
 
But neorealism differs from realism in three other ways, all of which follow 
from the overarching concept of anarchy. First, it changes causal relations. 
For realists, international outcomes can be explained with reference to unit-
level attributes, i.e. qualities or characteristics ascribed to states. For 
neorealists, states’ attributes are relatively unimportant against the 
comprehensive effects of anarchy on relations among states. Whereas 
realism is largely inductive (unit-level causation), neorealism is primarily 
deductive (structure-level causation) (Waltz, 1990: 32-34). Second, for 
realists power is both a means and an end. But neorealists argue that states 
strive for security more than power. (This introduces an element of 
‘defensiveness’ which would be absent otherwise). More importantly, for 
neorealists power is the defining characteristic of structure: “rather than 
viewing power as an end in itself, [neorealists] see power as a possibly 
useful means, with states running risks if they have either too little or too 
much of it” (ibid.: 36). Thus, the “distribution [of power] across states, and 
changes in that distribution, help[s] to define structures and changes in 
them” (ibid.: 36). Lastly, neorealists do not deny that states with different 
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internal organizations also behave differently in their relations with other 
states, but in an anarchic system states are made functionally similar, that is, 
they are expected to react similarly to the constraints of structure regardless 
of domestic attributes. As Waltz puts it, “[t]he logic of anarchy obtains 
whether the system is composed of tribes, nations, oligopolistic firms, or 
street gangs” (ibid.: 37).  
 
After establishing the major differences between realism and neorealism, I 
take a closer look at the core of Waltz’s theory. Theory of International 
Politics (1979) has become the central reference for neorealism and indeed 
for contemporary IR theory, so much so that “[a]lmost everyone in [the IR] 
world has been responding to Waltz in one way or another” (Mearsheimer, 
2006: 109). Waltz’s starting assumptions are twofold: (1) the basic ‘ordering’ 
principle of the international system is anarchy and (2) survival is states’ 
ultimate national interest. These two conditions will by themselves produce a 
particular kind of behavior - security competition (ibid.: 240). But this 
competition does not have to wind up in war because states are able, in fact 
they are often compelled, to engage in reciprocal power balancing. For 
structural realists the system is naturally able to balance itself out, since 
revisionist states will be kept in check by status quo powers. According to 
Waltz, states will try to achieve an appropriate amount of power. For this 
reason it is agreed that structural realism is inherently biased towards the 
status quo and is therefore essentially defensive (ibid.: 110-111). This places 
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a caveat on the theory’s breadth since it cannot account for expansionist or 
hegemonic courses of action. Waltz’s theory cannot explain the pursuit of 
imperialist or expansionist ambitions by great powers because it assumes 
that states will only seek a reasonable amount of power (‘more is not better 
if less is enough’). This entails holding back from excessive or extreme 
foreign policy goals. Cases which are not consistent with Waltz’s predictions 
– for example, imperial Germany, imperial Japan, nazi Germany - tend to be 
seen as anomalies (ibid.).  
 
Furthermore, Waltz argues that structural theory does not claim or aim to 
explain individual state behavior; instead it looks at the recurrent patterns of 
international outcomes (ibid: 112). It is one thing to explain foreign policy 
and another to develop a theory of international politics (Waltz, 1990: 26). 
To account for the exceptions another theory - a theory of foreign policy – is 
needed.  
 
This is where offensive realism comes in. Unlike structural realism, offensive 
realism does not assume that expansionist or imperialist approaches are 
necessarily unreasonable or folly. This is not to suggest that offensive 
realism promotes aggressive behaviour or that it legitimizes all sorts of 
militaristic incursions. But by extending the starting assumptions – 
particularly by assuming that states are rational actors - offensive realism is 
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actually able to account for them without turning to any other theory, foreign 
policy or otherwise.  
 
While this particular point of contention is certainly important as it sets the 
two theories apart, the overall discussion clearly makes more sense in the 
context of great power politics4. As mentioned, Waltz perspective does not 
“account for major variations at state level interactions (…) caused by local 
or specific factors” because these are “irreducible to the systems level” 
(Chatterjee, 2003: 129). Still, it is important to understand how, despite its 
limitations, neorealism can still shed some light on a country’s foreign policy 
actions or more generally interactions in a given region. Indeed, these 
theories, and the assumptions that go with them, have long shaped policy-
makers’ views of the world and how it works. This much is clear, for 
example, in Alexander Downer’s belief that 
Australian foreign policy must be based not on dreamy idealism, but on a clear-
headed understanding of the power structures of the Asia-Pacific region. It is 
insufficient for Australian foreign policy makers simply to assert our priority lies in our 
own region. We need to understand the weight of various regional powers and how 
the interrelationships between those powers affect the underlying security of the 
region. (Downer, 2000a; emphasis added) 
 
For this and other reasons it is questionable whether Waltz’s theory can 
indeed remain absolutely detached from the system’s units, as it is meant to 
                                                            
4
 This is clear in the selection of case studies: Japan (1868-defeat in world war II), Germany 
(1862-Hitler’s defeat in 1945), Soviet Union (1917-1991), United Kingdom (1792-1945) and 
the US (1800-1990). 
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be. Moreover, it is now common to find scholarship providing neorealist 
readings of particular events or particular foreign policy conducts (for 
example, Rice, 2008; Smith and Lowe, 2005; Karle, 2003; Dalrymple, 2003). 
What this paper does, then, is to use unit-level foreign policy behavior in 
association with structural factors, much like others have done (Chatterjee, 
2003: 142), for better results. Closeness of fit will not be perfect at all times, 
but then as Waltz would argue no theory can explain everything.  
 
While structural realism is useful in explaining some of the regional dynamics 
of which Australia is part, particularly in ‘the region to the north’, this view 
should be supplemented with some unit-level elements, which can be found 
in neorealism’s companion - neoliberalism. But before exploring this any 
further, it is important to sum up neorealism’s basic tenets. These are the 
elements from which it is possible to extract some cues on expected state 
behavior.  
 
First, it follows from the discussion above that states are the referent of any 
realist analysis. Despite the myriad of non-state actors working at the 
international level, it is ultimately the state that ‘calls the shots’. Second, 
anarchy as the basis of the international system is a given. In the absence of 
any vertical structure of order, no power mechanism or instance stands 
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above states and so rules, including international law, cannot be imposed. 
Third, the idea and ideals of community are relatively unimportant, if not 
outright dispensable. This is not to say that cooperation does not happen 
under anarchy, but for realists it is generally weak, irregular and unstable. 
Ultimately it depends on how much sovereignty a state is willing to relinquish 
and so it always goes back to the state. A state will engage in cooperative 
behavior so long as it benefits from it and others do not benefit significantly 
more (emphasis on relative vs. absolute gains). Similarly, moral standards 
may be useful and occasionally invoked if they are in line with states’ 
interests and if they help further its agenda; otherwise, there is no absolute 
morality in international politics. Fourth, competition in the international 
realm is further compounded by the security dilemma, itself a direct result of 
the anarchic condition. If state A chooses to protect itself by accumulating 
power (defined as capabilities, especially military-wise), state B will react 
accordingly by trying to keep up with state A. One state’s quest for security 
renders all others unsafe, thereby putting the entire system at risk. Fifth, 
despite these potentially dangerous triggers, states tend to achieve a balance 
of power which can be relatively stable. Changing the distribution of power 
usually entails periods of distress, possibly war. Finally, states are naturally 
rational. This assumption was (is) not shared by Waltz, but it is central for 
offensive realism (Cravinho, 2002: 199-230). 
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Though neoliberalism/institutionalism is considered neorealism’s opposite, 
the differences should not be overstated. Indeed, they share a similar set of 
assumptions: statism, rationality, anarchy. It follows that their security 
agenda is also roughly the same: security is primarily political and military 
with both dimensions reinforcing each other. Still, some caveats should be 
placed on this picture. First, the international state of nature can be 
mitigated through networks of cooperation at state level. These usually take 
the form of institutions, regimes and other multilateral arrangements. States 
may voluntarily forgo some of their inherent sovereign prerogatives in order 
to maximize relative gains; and they are not necessarily intent on preventing 
other states from benefiting more than they do. Multilateral fora constrain 
state behavior, though they cannot by themselves determine it. The result is 
a softer version of anarchy, where non-state actors may have a say and 
where the absence of order/an orderer does not have to translate into a 
permanent state of imminent conflict. Second, while retaining the centrality 
of security concerns, neoliberalism adds other layers, in particular the 
economic dimension. This links up with the previous point, in that a lot of the 
international integration that has taken place in the last decades has been 
economically motivated. Third, for institutionalists states are not unitary 
actors; their international conduct is at least partly shaped by domestic 
factors, such as elites, leaders, parties, lobbies, governmental agencies, and 
so forth. To some extent, state behavior will also reflect the ideas and 
preferences of these domestic groupings.  
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The following table sums up differences and similarities.  
 
 Neorealism Neoliberalism 
Nature of the 
international 
system 
Anarchic Anarchic 
International 
cooperation 
Entirely dependent on states; it will 
not happen unless states make it 
happen. It is hard to achieve and 
difficult to maintain. 
It is easy to achieve in areas where 
states have mutual interests.  
Type of gains 
(absolute vs. 
relative) 
The fundamental goal of states in 
cooperative relations is to prevent 
others from gaining more - relative 
gains. 
Actors with common interests try to 
maximize absolute gains, i.e. 
maximize the total amount of gains 
for all parties involved.   
Agenda 
priorities 
Mainly security issues - relative 
power, security, survival. 
Mainly economic issues – economic 
welfare, international political 
economy, other non-military issue 
areas.  
Role of 
capabilities 
States capabilities (power) are more 
important than their intentions and 
interests. That is what will 
determine their actions. 
Intentions and preferences are 
more important than capabilities 
defined in term of accumulated 
power. 
Institutions 
and regimes 
Relatively unimportant; they do not 
mitigate the constraining effects of 
anarchy on cooperation. 
Significant forces in international 
relations; facilitate cooperation.  
 
Table 1: An overview of neorealism and neoliberalism 
Adapted from Lamy (apud Baylis and Smith, 2001: 190) 
   
This last element seems to be the foundation for contemporary statebuilding 
efforts. As the argument goes, a state’s internal organization (political, 
economic, social) affects its external performance, making it more or less 
prone to conflict or cooperation. Therefore, if a state (by itself or in 
association with other sorts of actors) can influence or even change the 
14 
 
internal dynamics of another state, that will eventually reflect on overall 
interstate dynamics. These assumptions underpin contemporary neoliberal 
policies and they are the basis for the current peacebuilding consensus. 
However, it should be noted that neoliberalism/institutionalism tends to be 
used differently in the scholarly and in the policy fields (Lamy, 2001: 183-
184). Whereas in academia neoliberalism concerns the way in which 
institutions can mould state behavior, for practitioners neoliberalism is closer 
to an economic and political ideology.  
 
Economically, as capitalism develops it needs to include more markets so as 
to reproduce and advance the supply and demand dynamics. It is easier for 
capitalism to expand to similar markets. The system itself encourages 
interdependence and disencourages any obstacles to it, war being one of 
them. The promotion of economic interdependence will reverberate in the 
political arena: states will not usually allow economic flows to be disrupted 
by political differences amongst them because they realize how that would 
affect them in an age of interdependence. In other words, war is bad for 
business. The result, then, is that the more economically integrated states 
are, the more peaceful their relations will be.  
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Politically, while democracies can engage in conflictual behavior with 
authoritarian states, empirical evidence suggests that they tend not to fight 
other democracies. This is the essence of the democratic peace thesis 
(Dunne, 2001: 171). It follows that Western-style democracies will be safer if 
non-conforming states are also democracies. Together, the economic and 
the political arguments create powerful incentives for changing the status 
quo within states that fail or refuse to adjust.  
 
This kind of reasoning underlies contemporary Western-led interventions in 
failed states – the belief that spreading democracy (and capitalism, since one 
goes with the other) is in the interests of both established democracies and 
the soon-to-be. This has served as the justification for increasingly intrusive 
and innovative forms of governing the underdeveloped world. Following the 
events of 9/11, the deleterious effects of interconnectedness became 
abundantly clear, which in turn reinforced the state/peacebuilding consensus.  
 
But this consensus has not gone without its critics. In Global Governance and 
the New Wars Mark Duffield (2001) argues that the previously separate 
spheres of development and security have been merging. Underlying this 
argument is the assumption that the potential for expansion and 
inclusiveness of the current capitalist model is gone. The idea that the least 
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favored regions of the globe will eventually be co-opted into the developed 
world through the interplay of self-regulatory markets is no longer valid. 
What we have instead is a world where some regions (North America, 
Western Europe, and East Asia) prosper to the detriment of all others. This is 
not just a temporary imbalance, but rather the defining feature of modern-
day capitalism.  
 
Earlier, development aid/cooperation went hand in hand with the promotion 
of economic growth. Free markets, coupled with an ‘appropriate’ system of 
governance, would eventually do the trick. Thus, change – of the kind which 
would lift millions out of poverty – was to be effected indirectly, through 
neoliberal policies which could be traced back to the so-called Washington 
consensus. For many years this ideology would remain unchallenged. 
Following decolonization, several countries would opt for or be persuaded to 
comply with the neoliberal prescriptions of the structural adjustment 
programs led by the Bretton Woods international financial institutions. In the 
more technical explanation of former senior vice president and chief 
economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz (1998: 6) 
 
For more than four decades, development was seen (at least by those in the 
“mainstream”) as mainly a matter of economics - increasing the capital stock (either 
through transfers from abroad or through higher savings rates at home) and 
improving the allocation of resources. These changes would lead to higher incomes 
and hopefully higher sustained growth rates. Less developed countries were portrayed 
as identical to more developed countries - except perhaps in the extent of the 
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inefficiencies in resource allocations (which, in turn, were related to the greater 
incidence of missing or malfunctioning markets). 
 
The results were disappointing at best, disastrous at worst. While some (few) 
countries were able to adapt (economically, politically, socially and even 
culturally) to the neoliberal straitjacket, others (a few) remain trapped in the 
disruptive effects of the more-market-less-state combination. Indeed, it is 
now generally agreed that strengthening the state should have been the 
priority at such an early stage of development. Instead, it was assumed that 
market liberalization and deregulation by themselves would bring about the 
desired result.  
 
Development policies were aligned with this mantra. For years it was 
believed that through the promotion of economic growth societies would 
eventually come to terms with modernity. Thus, the kind of transformation 
envisaged in traditional development policies was an indirect one.  
 
During the cold war, the bipolar order ensured a relatively stable system 
where countries were either pro-USA, pro-USSR or non-aligned. With the 
cold war cloak gone, a surge of internal conflicts surfaced in the peripheral 
areas of the globe, though some were already in the making. These wars 
seemed to have new motivations; although there was usually some 
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disagreement as to the relative weight of the different sources of conflict, 
factors such as ethnicity, religion and resources were often invoked. What 
these conflicts had in common was the widely-held view that the causes 
were primarily internal (Ayoob, 1996: 67). In the international relations 
literature, this trend was captured in the concept of new wars and the theory 
behind it (Kaldor, 1999).  
 
The new wars discourse is not entirely consensual nor is it neutral. Duffield 
suggests that, although it may not have been intended that way, this 
concept and what it entails has actually contributed to the delegitimation of 
the post-nationalist state while also enabling increasingly radical governance 
experiments in the global borderlands. The new wars discourse has now 
become conventional wisdom, but its representation of violence in the 
borderlands has been criticized on the grounds of oversimplification and 
ahistoricism. New wars have often been portrayed as ethnically-rooted 
conflicts in which previously compatible ethnic groups now engage in low, 
occasionally high, level violence. Indeed, the analysis is often framed in 
extreme and not very useful terms, such as when some scholars questioned 
whether the South Pacific had gone from an ‘oasis of democracy’ to an ‘arc 
of instability’ (Reilly: 2000: 262). Needless to say, these labels have limited 
analytical value; while they may provide graspable simplifications of complex 
realities, they are also somewhat superficial. Moreover, they add to the 
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image of irrationality, barbarism and anarchy already associated with 
conflict-ridden areas. According to Duffield, representing the outlying areas 
in this way delegitimizes local populations and empowers external actors to 
intervene. It follows then that these concepts actually make external 
intervention easier insofar as they make it seem legitimate both at the 
international level and for the domestic audience; they work in favor of the 
external actors to the detriment of the populations. 
  
What this mainstream view often fails to acknowledge is that, in many cases, 
these wars are not just temporary altercations; instead they have evolved 
into alternative forms of political, economic and social organization. 
Specifically, in many parts of the world, violence, conflict and war are not the 
end itself but rather a means to an end. Often the motivation is economic: 
they provide livelihood opportunities which would be unavailable otherwise. 
In order to fend for itself, the majority of the population learns to work 
around the official economy, while other groups learn to turn a profit from 
the new business opportunities which arise from war (Collier, 2000). 
Eventually a parallel economy, with its own rules and regulations, is formed.  
 
These ‘zones of alternative regulation’ are often at odds with the prevailing 
model in the north. Despite attempts to contain their most violent 
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expressions, the negative effects of that alternative model have become 
increasingly felt in the north. Security, as a result, has had to broaden its 
scope to include a whole range of concerns which were not part of the 
agenda during the cold war. As Duffield (2002: 2) points out  
 
[t]oday, security concerns are no longer encompassed solely by the danger of 
conventional interstate war. The threat of an excluded South fomenting international 
instability through conflict, criminal activity and terrorism is now part of a new security 
framework.  
 
And he goes on to argue that within this new framework underdevelopment 
has become dangerous: underdevelopment in the south renders the north 
unsafe. This may take the shape of concerted attacks on particular symbols, 
unexpected and uncontrollable migration flows, disruption of vital trade 
flows/routes, etc. How then has the North responded to the new challenges 
posed by underdevelopment? According to Duffield, the North responded by 
radicalizing development. Development leads to security and conversely 
security fosters development. At government level, development has been 
increasingly securitized; one of the consequences at the operational level is 
that whereas previously the aid department was independent from the 
foreign policy and defense departments, there is now a large overlapping 
area. Both in principle and in the field, their actions have become aligned in 
the pursuit of a common goal. But what exactly is that goal?  
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While paying lip service to the old principles of sovereignty and non-
interference, development policies now aim to transform entire societies 
based on a logic of sameness: the idea that the more they think and behave 
like us, the safer we will be. In the process, various state and non-state 
actors converge in the implementation of radical development experiments in 
the so-called turbulent peripheries. Duffield points out that this is not a task 
for a single government or a single country. Rather, it results from the 
interactions of a variety of actors such as “governments, NGOs, military 
establishments and private companies” (2002: 2) which he calls ‘strategic 
complexes’. 
 
Although the new development enterprise bears some resemblance to earlier 
forms of colonialism and imperialism, its aims are different. The point is not 
so much territorial expansion, resource control, religious conversion, etc. 
Though it is not always easy to clearly isolate the causes for intervention in 
its various cases, by and large the new interventionism aims at exporting 
liberal peace to the so-called borderlands. In this framework, the 
transformation of societies is made easier by the techniques associated with 
conflict prevention and conflict resolution. According to this view, 
contemporary peacebuilding practices assist the ultimate goal of 
transforming mentalities, thereby contributing to the overall effort of ‘making 
them more like us’. But it should also be noted that the official rhetoric, 
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throughout, is to empower these populations for self-reliance, which may 
comes across as paradoxical. On the one hand, it is important to do a kind of 
intense coaching, for lack of a better expression, amongst the natives; on 
the other, the intervention should not be so intense as to compromise the 
populations’ capacity for autonomous self-reproduction which is assumed to 
be an intrinsic feature of the third world (what Duffield also calls the 
uninsured peoples of the world or bare life).  
 
All in all, these actors and their modus operandi constitute a new system of 
global liberal governance that aims to secure the north by containing the 
south, so that the consequences of persistent instability in the periphery do 
not migrate to the developed north. Thus, in this context biopolitics (control 
over populations) is now as important as geopolitics (control over territory), 
if not more.  
 
This chapter reviewed the main theories which help explain Australia’s 
foreign policy during the Howard years. The following chapter looks closer 
into Australia’s relations with its neighborhood, particularly with East Timor 
and the Solomon Islands.  
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Part 2: Australia’s new interventionism in the Pacific 
 
This chapter looks in some detail into Australia’s foreign policy towards the 
South Pacific during the Howard years. Two particular countries have been 
chosen to illustrate policy differences and continuities: East Timor and the 
Solomon Islands. In both cases there was an unequivocal revision of the 
traditional, bipartisan approach. However, while in East Timor this revision 
was originally ad hoc in nature, in Solomons it was fully intentional. Some 
see Australia’s leadership of the multinational peacekeeping force InterFET 
(International Force for East Timor) in 1999 as the turning point in Australian 
foreign policy towards its neighbors. This may be true to some extent, but 
because it was essentially a reactive process – despite official claims to the 
contrary – this argument looses strength against the process that leading up 
to RAMSI’s deployment. It is RAMSI that represents Australia’s sea change 
towards the South Pacific because of the grounds on which the mission was 
justified. Furthermore, RAMSI set the tone for Australia’s approach to the 
entire region, not just to that particular country (Wainwright, 2003: 7). 
 
What I set out to do in this chapter is to try to understand what changed: 
why did Australia abandon its traditional hands-off approach in favor of an 
interventionist stance? What does that tell us about the regional dynamics? 
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And how does it relate to the wider global dynamics? Naturally all of these 
questions have a lot to do with timing.  
 
In view of that distinction (the pre- and post-RAMSI phases), it could be 
argued that even though Australia first got engaged in East Timor in 1999, 
its policy towards the new nation also proceeded somewhat differently after 
the country’s independence in 2002 (RAMSI was deployed in July 2003). In 
other words, the ‘RAMSI effect’ can be seen in East Timor too. This is 
perhaps unsurprising since after May 2002 the UN no longer ruled over the 
country and East Timor was now supposed to develop regular bilateral 
relations with other nations. The fact that geographically it is not a South 
Pacific but Southeast Asian country is also not an obstacle, since in some 
respects it bears more resemblance with the Pacific than with other 
Southeast Asian nations, particularly in terms of the problems it had to face 
since independence. Furthermore, Australia seems to have a common 
approach to both East Timor and its Pacific counterparts, suggesting a policy 
of similar answers to similar problems regardless of geographical categories.  
 
The chapter starts with some background information on Australia’s relations 
with the Pacific. It then reviews the main case studies stressing the reasons 
for intervention (justification) and the shape it took (implementation).  
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2.1. Defining the Pacific 
 
What is meant by Pacific or South Pacific? The Pacific is divided into three 
ethnic subregions: Micronesia, Polynesia, and Melanesia. This relatively 
marginal region represents ¼ of the globe. It is largely made up of insular 
micro-states, most of which achieved independence during the cold war 
following the UN’s push for self-determination. Map no. 1 presents a detailed 
view of these regional groupings (see attachment 2) while map no. 2 shows 
a view of the globe from the Australian perspective (see attachment 3). The 
following table provides a quick guide to the region.  
 
Region Countries 
Strongest 
influence 
Degree of 
instability 
Micronesia 
North of the 
equator 
Nauru 
Palau  
Federated States of Micronesia 
Marshall Islands  
Guam (US) 
Northern Marianas (US) 
USA 
(Japan) 
Low 
Polynesia 
Southeast of 
the equator 
New Zealand 
Hawaii (US) 
Easter Island 
Kiribati 
Tuvalu 
Samoa (US) 
Tonga 
Cook Islands (New Zealand)  
Niue (New Zealand) 
Tokelau (New Zealand) 
French Polynesia (France) 
Wallis and Futuna (France) 
New Zealand 
(US) 
(France) 
(Australia) 
Lowest 
Melanesia 
Southwest of 
the equator 
Papua New Guinea 
Solomon Islands  
Vanuatu 
Fiji 
New Caledonia (France)  
Australia 
(France) 
High 
 
Table 2: The Pacific island region 
Adapted from Hoadley, 2005: 3-4 
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Australia is the most important foreign power in Melanesia, nearest to 
Australian shores. In this paper Pacific/South Pacific/Southwest Pacific are 
used loosely to refer to the Melanesian subregion. In the last years/decades 
this region has been afflicted by a variety of internal conflicts. Map no. 3 is 
an extreme and not very accurate illustration of this trend, yet it represents 
what the region has come to mean for many Australians (see attachment 4). 
Although on a closer look these countries face different challenges, they are 
often lumped together in public discourse, including occasionally in 
governmental and academic circles. In the last years Australia has intervened 
in various ways in five of these countries: Solomon Islands, Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Tonga as well as in East Timor.  
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2.2. Background to Australia’s relations with the Pacific 
 
Australia’s involvement with the Pacific is often described in terms of phases, 
although timelines and contents do not always match. Below is how 
Alexander Downer summarized Australia’s relations with the Pacific in 2007:   
 
Our approach to meeting the challenges of the Pacific has evolved over time. Most 
Pacific countries gained their independence in the 1970s. At that time, Australia saw 
its role as helping to establish the foundations of independent government and 
providing development assistance but otherwise leaving these newly independent 
countries to find their own way. By the 1990s it was becoming clear that this was not 
working effectively. Economies were stagnating. Living standards were levelling off. 
Civil tensions were rising in the face of ineffective governments. In 1997 we 
recognized the need to step up our engagement. We, with New Zealand, took a 
leading role in settling the Bougainville conflict. We worked hard to encourage a 
return to democracy after the coup in Fiji in 2000. We took the lead in establishing the 
Townsville process to end the conflict in the Solomon Islands. From 2003, we took 
decisive steps to confront the Pacific’s challenges more directly. We established, along 
with other Pacific Island forum countries, the Regional Assistance Mission to the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and led the [m]ission, which we still do. We began our 
Enhanced Cooperation Program with Papua New Guinea in 2004. In both cases we 
committed to long-term engagement to get to the roots of the problems of 
governance and economic development. (Downer, 2007)  
 
The first phase (absent in Downer’s review) broadly coincides with the first 
half of the 20th century. As a young nation, geographically isolated from the 
main power centers of the time and born in a region with which it shared few 
cultural traits, Australian leaders felt that its security was directly dependent 
on maintaining good relations with its former colonizer (UK) and with the 
emerging hegemon (US). This was the beginning of a tradition of 
maintaining special relationships with 'great and powerful friends' as a 
guarantee against external threat.  
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The colonial period 
It was against this background that relations with the Pacific were first 
conceived. Back then the Pacific was seen as a platform from which attacks 
on the Australian mainland could be carried out. It was relevant for Australia 
mainly in security terms. As early as 1918, then prime minister William Morris 
Hughes (1915-1923) called for a Monroe doctrine for Australia:  
 
This brings me to a matter of life and death importance to Australia. America, 
Australia, and New Zealand have common interests in the Pacific. And Australia looks 
to you [the US], her elder brother, to stand by her around the peace table as well as 
on the field of battle. For if we are to continue to be a Commonwealth of free people, 
we must have guarantees against enemy aggression in the future. And this involves 
an Australasian Monroe Doctrine in the Southern Pacific. 
 
And he would go on to say: 
 
(…) Australia is a great island. Along its northern and eastern shores, guarding or 
menacing its coasts, according as they are held by friend or foe, are three belts of 
islands. (…) [D]ozens of [small] islands stretch out [from Papua New Guinea] forming 
a part of one of these belts which run parallel with the coast of Australia. (…) What 
would your attitude be toward any predatory power that claimed territory so near to 
your own shores? (…) [T]he position of Australia is such that it is essential to its 
territorial integrity that it should either control these islands
5
 itself or that they should 
be in the hands of friendly and civilized nations. (…) To allow another nation to 
control them would be to allow it to control Australia. 
 
So we come to you, our great ally, seeking your steadfast and whole-hearted co-
operation and aid. Hands off the Australian Pacific is the doctrine to which by 
inexorable circumstances we are committed. (…) And in this we do not desire empire, 
but only security. (The New York Times, 1918) 
 
                                                            
5 Australia was both a colony and a colonizer at the same time. It colonized Papua New 
Guinea from 1883 to 1975 and shared responsibility for Nauru with New Zealand and the UK 
until 1968 (Peebles, 2005: 47).  
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These comments sound all too similar to contemporary views on the region, 
which suggests a basic continuity in Australian foreign policy with regard to 
its Pacific neighboring states. This view would be validated during world war 
II when Japan attacked Australia through the northern city of Darwin and 
established points d’appui in nearby islands (Peebles, 2005: 46), including 
East Timor.  
 
Strategic denial 
The second phase begins with Pacific island states independence, when 
bilateral relations were no longer conducted with the metropole but with the 
new nations themselves. The policy of strategic denial aimed at denying any 
kind of communist presence in the region. Such a presence would disturb the 
balance of power in the region and would again represent a threat for 
Australia. During this time the USSR made its way into the Pacific through 
fishing arrangements with Kiribati and Vanuatu and the establishment of 
diplomatic ties with Papua New Guinea. To ensure that the region remained 
communist-free, more aid was disbursed and economic cooperation 
attempted (in the form of the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement) (Schultz, 2007: 2).  
 
Constructive commitment 
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The third phase was initiated by Gareth Evans, foreign minister (1988-1996) 
during the Keating administrations (1991-1996). During this time economic 
issues became as important as security concerns. Evans notably said that 
Australia would now “approach the region within a framework of regional 
partnership, not dominance” (Evans and Grant 1995 apud Peebles, 2005: 
48). The Labor government appointed a minister for Pacific Island affairs for 
the first time, but this post would be discontinued under John Howard. 
However, the policy of constructive engagement would be followed by 
Alexander Downer until the current phase of cooperative intervention. But as 
Peebles points out (2005: 48) “[t]he policy of constructive commitment was 
sufficiently broad and flexible enough to be somewhat schizophrenic as well” 
due to the vast and different positions under that label. For example, during 
the first two Howard-Downer terms constructive engagement equated with a 
markedly hands off approach, which would stand in contrast with the new 
interventionism that followed. As usual, it is not easy to draw the line 
between the official discourse of non-interference and respect for a country’s 
independence and a more indifferent kind of posture (ibid.: 49). This much is 
clear in the following statement by Downer (2000b): 
 
Commonly over the years, we have heard, throughout the countries of the South 
Pacific, references to Australia as the “big brother”, throwing its weight around the 
region and dominating the affairs of its smaller neighbours. Imagine our confusion 
when, more recently, Australia has been criticized for not meddling in the affairs of its 
neighbours and not intervening militarily to address the security problems that have 
emerged in countries like Solomon Islands. 
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New interventionism 
The current phase coincides with the initial deployment of RAMSI in July 
2003. It is explored in detail in the subsequent sections.  
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2.3. What changed? Global and regional dynamics intersect 
 
What was it specifically that set off the 2003 reexamination of Australia’s 
priorities? There is no single cause for this but there is some consensus 
among scholars as to the most likely explanations. This section undertakes a 
review of Howard and Downer’s pronouncements on this issue in order to 
understand the official motivations. Starting with the ‘pre-Solomon Islands’ 
period helps illustrate the extent of Australia’s foreign policy transformation. 
   
Canberra’s initial position was one of detachment. While Australia had been 
involved in earlier efforts to bring an end to the conflict6, it remained 
reluctant to take its engagement to the next level. The Australian 
government twice rejected direct assistance requests by prime minister Allan 
Kemakeza. The official policy was clearly laid out in the 2003 foreign and 
trade policy white paper Advancing the National Interest:  
 
Australia cannot presume to fix the problems of the South Pacific countries. Australia 
is not a neo-colonial power. The island countries are independent sovereign states. 
They want and need to tackle their problems in their own way, developing systems of 
government which the governed accept as fair, equitable, effective and true to 
themselves, and which deliver basic services. When problems are so tightly bound to 
complex cultural traditions and ethnic loyalties, only local communities can find 
workable solutions. (DFAT, 2003: 93)  
 
                                                            
6
 Australia had brokered the Townsville peace agreement in 15 October 2000 and 
subsequently helped form (along with New Zealand) a peacekeeping mission tasked with 
supervising disarmament efforts.  
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The same view was expressed in no uncertain terms by Downer himself on 8 
January 2003 in an opinion piece entitled Neighbors cannot be recolonized:  
 
Australia is not about to recolonize the South Pacific, nor should it. (…) Sending in 
Australian troops to occupy the Solomon Islands would be folly in the extreme. It 
would be widely resented in the Pacific region. It would be very difficult to justify to 
Australian taxpayers. And for how many years would such an occupation have to 
continue? And what would be the exit strategy? The real show-stopper, however, is 
that it would not work – no matter how it was dressed up, whether as an Australian or 
a Commonwealth or a Pacific Island Forum initiative. The fundamental problem is that 
foreigners do not have answers for the deep-seated problems afflicting Solomon 
Islands. (Downer, 2003) 
 
However, less than six months later Canberra would retract from this initial 
position. Following another request for intervention by Solomon’s prime 
minister, Australia decided to lead a regional mission of assistance. How did 
Howard-Downer account for this abrupt reversal? In June 2003 Downer 
explained: 
 
[W]e will not sit back and watch while a country slips inexorably into decay and 
disorder. I say this not just for altruistic reasons. Already the region is troubled by 
business scams, illegal exploitation of natural resources, crimes such as gun running, 
and the selling of passports and bank licenses to dubious foreign interests. (Downer, 
2003 apud Wainwright, 2003) 
 
At the same time a new framework for intervention was adopted: RAMSI 
would operate under the principle of cooperative intervention. Downer was 
joined by prime minister John Howard, who justified the intervention on 
these grounds:  
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The Solomons is our patch (…). If the Solomons becomes a failed state, it’s a haven 
potentially for terrorists, drug runners and money launderers (…). We don’t want that 
on our doorstep. 
 
The terrorist attacks in the US and Bali, and the arrests in Singapore, Indonesia, and 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, demonstrate the reach of terrorism and show that our 
region is no longer immune. (Howard, 2003 apud Kabutaulaka, 2004) 
 
And on another occasion he added that 
 
If we do nothing now and the Solomons becomes a failed state (…) potential 
exploitation of that situation by international drug dealers, money launderers, 
international terrorism (…) will make the inevitable dealing with the problem in the 
future more costly, more difficult. (Howard, 2003 apud Kabutaulaka, 2004: 5)  
 
Similarly, with a few months hindsight (December 2003 interview) Downer 
reviewed Australia’s position as follows: 
 
If [Australia ends] up with failed states in [her] vicinity then those failed states can be 
exploited by any manner of people; by drug traffickers, money launderers, people 
smugglers, even, God forbid, terrorists. Nobody took any notice of Afghanistan as a 
failed state or quasi-failed state under the Taliban, yet hell was brewing there. We, 
the world, lost interest in Afghanistan and for that matter lost interest in Pakistan - 
the West particularly - and any manner of bad things were happening in those 
countries which led to 9/11… The unpredictability of allowing states just to fail and 
become completely lawless is something to worry about, quite apart from the 
humanity of it.  
How would Australians feel if they just allowed neighboring countries, with really no 
other major source of support from other parts of the world to go to rack and ruin? 
You can't do that. There was far too little focus for a long time on the Pacific; after 
PNG's independence we gradually lost interest in it. You just can't turn your back on 
the South Pacific. It's a very important area and I think the world looks to Australia to 
take a lead. The intervention in the Solomon Islands is part of us having a more 
robust approach to the region; that's how we came to think about what more we 
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could do in PNG. I couldn't feel that continuing with the status quo was giving us 
good enough results.  
So, instead of a lot of the traditional type of aid programs we have in the Pacific - 
what I sometimes call, metaphorically speaking, digging water wells… fine, 
humanitarian kind of work, providing stationery for primary schools or whatever - we 
have been much more proactive in trying to build better policing, better public 
administration. In the past we were very sensitive about being neo-colonialist, and 
we've decided that we weren't getting sufficiently good outcomes that way. If we 
don't achieve good outcomes in the Pacific, who else is going to? (The Age, 2003)  
 
This is but a sample of the arguments put forth to justify the intervention. 
Yet a few common themes run through these official pronouncements. 
Following Kabutaulaka (2005), I isolate four major causes for the 
intervention, all of which are present to different degrees in the statements 
above: 
 
 Australia’s role in the war on terror, 
 The failing Solomon Islands state, 
 Australia’s negative perception of island countries, 
 Australia’s self-perception as leader and superior arbiter of regional 
affairs. 
 
As we will see further on, Australia’s policy reversal reflects not only changes 
at the regional level but also changes in the global security discourse (ibid.: 
302). The next sections deal with each of these causes separately. 
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2.3.1. Australia and the war on terror 
 
Australia was involved in the so-called war on terror from the very start. John 
Howard happened to be visiting his American counterpart (on the occasion of 
the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS alliance) at the exact moment the US was 
attacked. Reportedly that left an impression on him and soon after Howard 
would declare Australia’s full support for the American retaliation plans by 
invoking the ANZUS treaty for the first time, an important symbolic gesture 
(Dobell, 2009). As a result, Australia joined the ‘coalition of the willing’ and 
committed troops and other resources to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
Australia’s drive to assist the US-led war on terror was later strengthened by 
the attacks on the Indonesian island of Bali, Southeast Asia’s tourist hub. 
These attacks further legitimized what critics could otherwise describe as just 
another instance of Australia fighting ‘other people’s wars’ (Koo, 2005). On 
12 October 2002 bombs went off in two Balinese bars in one of the island’s 
most renowned and tourist-heavy area. 88 Australians died in the attacks 
(out of 202 victims) which were claimed by Jemaah Islamyah, a Southeast 
Asian-based terrorist organization with links to Al Qaida.  
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The fact that the target of the attacks was this particular Indonesian island 
carries a lot of symbolism. Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country 
(around 90% of the population professes Islam), but for historical reasons 
most Balinese people adhere to Hinduism. For this and other reasons the 
island has evolved somewhat differently from the rest of the country. 
Through the years the large influx of tourists has westernized Balinese 
society while also defining its cultural idiosyncrasies. Therefore, the attacks 
on Bali – which incidentally would happen again in 2005 – were not just 
attacks on Bali and its effects were acutely felt in Australia.  
 
Although it is obviously not a part of Australian territory, Bali is part of what 
Lewis (2006: 223) called “Australia’s cultural imagining”:  
 
For Australians (…) Bali has come to represent a propinquity of ‘Oriental’ pleasure and 
self-reflection, a place in which the exotic ‘other’ can be experienced through various 
gradients of immersion. Clearly, Paddy’s Bar and the Sari Club were bombed not 
merely because they were ‘soft’ targets, but because they symbolized the globalizing 
effect of commodified imagining. The global capital and cosmopolitan lifestyle, which 
are symbolized in the twenty-two nationalities of the dead, have become the ensigns 
of moral and ideological decadence for the terrorist attackers. There is a dramatic 
dissonance between the imagining of the victims and that of the perpetrators. These 
mostly first world citizens, trapped in the throes of their pleasure, become ideal 
targets for organizations like Jamaah Islamiyah [sic] (…) because they are so entirely 
oblivious to the violence upon which their privilege is formed. (Lewis, 2006) 
 
This is how the attacks were perceived in Australia: as an attack on Australia 
and her values. A renowned member of Howard’s government notably said in 
a December 2008 interview (ABC, 2008a) that “[the attacks on Bali] was 
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Australia as a terrorist target, unambiguously for the first time. (…) [U]p until 
the Bali [b]ombing people thought the Americans were the terrorist targets. 
After Bali they knew Australians were the targets of terrorists”. A similar view 
– that “terrorism threatens Australia at home and overseas” - was also 
expressed in the 2003 DFAT white paper (2003: 36). In short, if Australia 
was already a potential target due to its close association with the US, Bali in 
effect brought terrorism home to Australia. 
 
At the same time, the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia was likened to the 
one in the Middle East: “The Bali bombings showed that Islamic extremists in 
South-East Asia are now prepared to take up the anti-Western campaign of 
Middle Eastern terrorists and to follow their example by inflicting mass 
casualties. The bombings highlighted the links that have developed between 
entrenched regional extremist groups and global Islamic terrorism” (ibid.: 
17). In this respect Bali confirmed Southeast Asia’s rank as the second front 
of the war on terror.  
 
Thus, an important side effect of the Bali bombings was the vindication of 
the government’s strategy of unconditional support for the US-led war on 
terror. This option would be further legitimized when in 9 September 2004 
the Australian embassy in Jakarta was attacked also by Jemaah Islamiyah 
(Bordonaro, 2006: 2).  
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2.3.2. State failure in the Solomon Islands 
 
Even though Canberra was quick to support the American cause, it did not 
embrace the failed state discourse so swiftly. Unlike 9/11 in the US, the 
turning point for Australia seemed to come with RAMSI. Prior to that, the link 
between terrorism and failed states was never clearly assumed (Lambach, 
2004: 13). RAMSI, however, changed all that.  
 
With RAMSI underway, the release of Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and 
the Future of Solomon Islands in June 2003 was a fortunate coincidence7. 
What is striking in retrospect is how much of what this policy report 
recommends actually translated into the mission. That and the fact that the 
report was produced by the government-funded conservative think-tank 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute suggests that the timing was not 
accidental (Wainwright, 2003). The report fulfilled two main functions: it built 
on a number of arguments to make the case for intervention and it went into 
detail about the practicalities associated with implementation. It met the 
needs of a specific audience – governmental decision-makers – and as such 
became the blueprint for intervention.  
 
                                                            
7 RAMSI was deployed on 24 July 2003.  
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The report describes Solomon Islands as a state heading towards collapse: a 
failing state whose inexorable descent into chaos could only be arrested 
through direct outside intervention, since traditional approaches (aid mostly) 
had proven ineffective (Wainwright, 2003: 7). It goes to great lengths to 
supply a comprehensive yet consensual policy option. It conceives of RAMSI 
as a “middle ground between [Australia’s] present detachment and an 
attempt to reassert colonial rule” (Wainwright, 2003: 9) because 
“statebuilding need not be neocolonialism” (ibid.: 30).  
 
It traces the origins of the crisis to the colonial period and explicitly equates 
the current situation in Sub-Saharan Africa with that of the South Pacific in 
view of these states’ “extremely short history” (ibid.: 28): the Western legal-
rational model of statehood has not held because the state was conceived 
but never born (ibid.: 20). The result is that the country is now caught in a 
“classic vicious circle”, a “trap from which there appears no escape” (ibid.: 
27).  
 
The report draws frequent, sometimes dubious, analogies with former and 
current cases of foreign intervention in failing or failed states within the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention: “The challenge for Australia is to see 
whether there is a way of applying the state failure and statebuilding models 
developed elsewhere over the past decade to our problems in Solomon 
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Islands” (ibid.: 31). While these cases provide a useful starting point for the 
regional assistance mission, the report puts great emphasis on avoiding the 
pitfalls which were then associated with the UN-led missions in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor and so on, and here lies its original 
contribution.  
 
At the same time, the report complements and reinforces a trend already 
underway: the move to securitize failing and failed states in the Australian 
periphery. The link between security abroad and security at home is explicitly 
made: securing mainland Australia per se may not be enough, it is now also 
necessary to safeguard its northern and eastern approaches. And if these 
countries cannot by themselves ensure such protection, as is typically the 
case with failed states, then Canberra accords itself the right to step in and 
do that for them. Neighboring states are expected to step up to the new 
challenges and exert full control over their territory and population. Inability 
to do so may now entail foreign intervention (preferably) with or (ultimately) 
without consent. In this new security setting, security at home hinges on 
security abroad. This of course is not exactly a new theme in Australian 
foreign policy, as we have seen earlier, but it acquired different contours 
following 9/11 and in particular RAMSI.  
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How was this link established? The underlying assumption is that in the new 
security environment the failure of the Solomons state will not naturally 
entail a return to “the Pacific Island idyll of subsistence prosperity among the 
palm trees” (ibid.: 13). Instead, if left unchecked, state failure in the 
Solomons [will] likely lead to the country becoming “a Petri dish for 
transnational threats” (ibid.) or a “post-modern badlands, ruled by criminals 
and governed by violence” (ibid.). Clearly it was not in Australia’s interests to 
have such a state in its vicinity as that would increase Australia’s vulnerability 
to “transnational criminal operations based in or operating out of Solomon 
Islands – drug smuggling, gun-running, identity fraud and people smuggling 
(…) [p]erhaps even terrorism” (ibid.: 14). Moreover, problems in SI could 
very well spread to neighbouring countries, exacerbating Australia’s plight: 
“Collapse in Solomon Islands would make it all the harder for other weak 
states to hold the line” (ibid., emphasis added).  
 
And so the causal link between failed states and terrorism is made: because 
failed states cannot ensure control over their territory they become the ideal 
location for terrorists who may operate unconstrained from there. This line of 
reasoning is not new or specific to this particular region; in fact it bears 
striking resemblance to the Bush administration’s rhetoric in the run up to 
the war in Afghanistan and later Iraq. However, it was only around RAMSI 
that Australia definitely adopted the new security discourse and effectively 
securitized state failure. Whereas previously the problems afflicting these 
44 
 
states were dealt with as humanitarian issues, they were now considered 
matters of national security and therefore had to be tackled within a security 
framework (Kabutaulaka, 2005: 296).  
 
As we have seen earlier, these views were not expressed only or primarily in 
this report. Before it was even published, Australian authorities had already 
taken on this discourse to account for the unexpected change of plans. After 
that they also stayed in message, as evidenced in Nick Warner’s (RAMSI 
special coordinator) retrospective assessment of the need for intervention:  
 
From Australia’s perspective, intervening to ensure Solomon Islands did not descend 
into chaos was (…) an imperative. Plainly, a dysfunctional Solomon Islands held long 
term dangers for Australia and the region. A country beholden to armed thugs is a 
recipe for chronic instability. Such instability is an invitation to transnational crime. 
Experience elsewhere shows that weak states are also attractive as havens for money 
laundering, people smuggling, drug smuggling and terrorism. And while there is no 
evidence that transnational criminals were targeting Solomon Islands, there was no 
point in waiting for this to happen. (Warner, 2004 apud Kabutaulaka, 2005: 295) 
 
The concept of state failure, and the doomsday scenario that goes with it, 
emerges here not so much as an accurate and neutral description of the 
situation in the country, but rather as an ‘enhancement technique’ that 
overstates the threat in order to legitimize courses of action which would be 
unlikely under normal circumstances. As such, it can be thought of as a 
theoretical tool that bridges the gap between the desire to intervene (for 
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whatever reasons) and the long-established international constraints on 
infringements of sovereignty.  
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2.3.3. Australia’s negative perception of island countries 
 
Along with the failed states discourse, the problems facing the region also 
inspired a new and timely stream of scholarship which was particularly well-
received amongst policy circles. Two particular concepts or ideas emerged 
around this time. The first linked the troubles in the Pacific to the kind of 
protracted violence usually taken as endemic to the African continent. The 
Pacific had, in effect, become ‘Africanized’ in that its floundering economies, 
failing states, and ethnically polarized populations all converged to create a 
situation reminiscent of the ‘hopeless continent’. The argument was first 
exposed by Ben Reilly in the article The Africanisation of the South Pacific8. 
Reilly (2000: 262-263) contends that the Africanization of the South Pacific 
can be ascertained from “four inter-related phenomena that have long been 
associated with violent conflict and the failure of democratic government in 
Africa: 
 
 the growing tensions in the relationship between civil regimes and 
military forces; 
 the intermixture between ethnic identity and the competition for 
control of natural resources as factors driving conflicts; 
                                                            
8 The practice of drawing of analogies and homologies between different regions of the 
globe is not exactly new. Other examples include: Caribbeanization, Balkanization, 
Indigenization.  
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 the weakness of basic institutions of governance such as prime 
ministers, parliaments and, especially, political parties; and 
 the increasing centrality of the state as a means of gaining wealth 
and of accessing and exploiting resources”. 
 
Together these factors suggest “a growing weakness of democracy and an 
increasing likelihood of further troubles in the region in the future”. 
Specifically, “they indicate that some of the problems that have plagued 
states in Sub-Saharan Africa may well be emerging in the South Pacific” 
(ibid.: 263).  
 
Of course the Africanization thesis did not go without its critics. Some 
authors lambasted Reilly’s argument as “analytically weak, internally 
inconsistent and empirically flawed” because while some of those countries 
do face serious problems “political crises tend to be localized, episodic and 
obedient to very specific historical causes which are not adequately explained 
by the loose and rather ill-informed analogy with Africa” (Fraenkel, 2004: 2; 
Chappell, 2005; Teaiwa, 2006). Nevertheless, given its parsimonious logic 
the Africanisation thesis caught on amongst academics, bureaucrats, the 
media, and even aid donors. A clear example of this is the likening of the 
South Pacific with Sub-Saharan Africa in the ASPI report (2003: 28) or how 
easily this line of thought both informed and emerged from the Australian 
media (Chappell, 2005: 297).  
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Fraenkel notes (2004: 1) that the Africanisation thesis resulted from and 
enabled a larger trend of explanation-by-analogy. Not only was instability in 
the Pacific similar to that in Africa but the timing of consecutive destabilizing 
events often resulted in ‘copy-cat’ interpretations of the patterns of violence. 
In other words, the idea that troubles in one island-country were spreading 
(by example) into others became conventional wisdom. For example, writing 
in 2000, the foreign editor of a leading Australian newspaper argued that the 
coup in the Solomons was a “direct progeny of the coup in Fiji” and that the 
South Pacific was ‘”sliding towards ‘an abyss of African dimensions’” 
(Sheridan, 2000 apud Fraenkel, 2004: 1).  
 
Another concept that also caught on around this time was the ‘arc of 
instability’. This time its scientific basis was perhaps a bit more solid (see for 
example Rumley, 2006), but it still advanced the idea that the region was 
plagued by numerous sources of (mostly non-state) threats which could spill 
over to Australia in multiple ways (e.g. refugees, terrorist attacks, disruption 
of critical trade routes, etc.). The concept originally applied to Australia’s 
immediate north but following Indonesia’s transition to democracy it was 
stretched to encompass the eastern front. Current prime minister Kevin Rudd 
(n/a) also endorsed this idea: 
 
Within our more immediate region, the Arc of Instability to our North and North-
East has gone from being a strategic concept a decade ago to becoming an 
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unsettling strategic reality today – with Jema’ah Islamiyah’s continued operations 
in the Indonesian archipelago; police and military crises in East Timor; continuing 
challenges to political stability in Papua New Guinea; ethnic violence in Vanuatu; 
the implosion of law and order in the Solomon Islands; a series of unprecedented 
street violence in Tonga; and Nauru the region’s first properly defined failed state 
having also become a centre for international money laundering. In short, the 
report card across the Arc of Instability over the last decade is not a good one.  
 
The concept of an arc of instability to Australia’s north is geographically 
grounded and thus perhaps less ideologically-charged than that of 
Africanisation. Still, it is hard to escape the conclusion that, together with the 
failed state discourse, the parallel emergence of these conceptual 
‘innovations’ that cut across academic and practitioner fields do not merely 
describe but are actually constitutive of the reality they try to portray. Not 
only is it not clear what came first – did the concept originate in academic or 
governmental circles? who borrowed from whom? -  but the ‘fuzzy sequence 
problem’ also raises questions about the side effects of such scholarship – 
could the end result be the creation of an environment conducive to 
‘extraordinary’ measures? Indeed, many seem to arrive at this conclusion. 
According to Chappell (2005: 290) the Africanisation thesis is “ultimately an 
orientalist discourse, whose negative, timeless imaging of ‘others’ is still 
being used to justify metropolitan hegemonies”. As flawed as it may be, it 
illustrates that the way in which violence is coded, categorized and 
sometimes caricatured is an important political act in that “representations 
have political implications” (Demmers, 2006: 100).  
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2.3.4. Australia’s self-perception as leader and arbiter of regional 
affairs 
 
 
A further theme that runs through the official discourse for intervention is the 
assumption that either Australia does it or no one else will. Australian 
authorities believe that Canberra has primary responsibility over the region. 
Alexander Downer said that “(…) the problem here is that for Australia we 
are (…) by far the richest country in the region and therefore there isn’t 
really any alternative but for Australia to take a leadership role” 
(Kabutaulaka, 2005: 297). The prime minister also echoed this view when he 
declared that “the Solomons is [Australia’s] patch” (Kabutaulaka, 2004). In a 
similar vein, the ASPI report (2003: 17) advances the idea of Australia’s 
unique stake: ‘[Australia has] security interests in many parts of the globe, 
but only in the Southwest Pacific are they our interests alone. Only in the 
Southwest Pacific [does Australia] have to take the lead (…). If we do not, 
others might move in to exploit the situation, to our detriment9’.  
 
                                                            
9 Obviously if others might move in then it is not only Australia that exerts influence in the 
region (although presumably this refers to both state and non-state actors). Clearly the 
image of the region as no more than a ‘hole in the Asia-Pacific doughnut’ (Chappell, 2005: 
294) is undeniable. But as we have seen earlier other powers (USSR, China vs. Taiwan, 
France) also vied for influence in this part of the world during and after the cold war, 
thereby lifting its position in the global geopolitical ranking and in the global knowledge 
market.  
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What transpires from the official rhetoric is both a sense of enlightenment 
and the idea of a manifest destiny – not only is Australia the only country 
able to and interested in keeping its neighbors from failing but it is also the 
best country to do so. Downer himself said so: ‘if we don't achieve good 
outcomes in the Pacific, who else is going to?’ (The Age, 2003). 
 
This sense of ‘responsibility’ may stem in part from the fact that to this day 
Australia’s constitution (1900) still includes a clause granting legislative 
powers to the parliament to regulate ‘the relations of the Commonwealth 
with the islands of the Pacific’ (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 
1900: 22) as well as from the more prosaic acknowledgment that Australia is 
indeed the most powerful country in the region.  
 
However, not only does this line of thinking reinforce and sustain pre-existing 
hierarchies amongst the countries in the region but it also implies both a 
sense of inevitability and an absence of alternatives. Indeed, for Kabutaulaka 
(2005: 297) Australia essentially maintains a “paternalistic and patronizing 
relationship with the Pacific Islands, reflected in often-unacknowledged 
thinking and practice that the region needs a stronger, wealthier, and 
democratically advanced country as its leader”. Thus, the idea that Australia 
must go it alone because no one else will effectively belittles the region and 
misrepresents its history.  
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2.4. Australia and the Solomon Islands 
 
2.4.1. Violence in Solomon Islands – a background 
 
The Solomon Islands comprise over 1000 islands and approximately 500.000 
inhabitants unequally distributed through its territory: more than half live in 
the two main islands, Guadalcanal and Malaita (see attachment 5). From 
1893 to 1978 the archipelago was a British protectorate and after 
independence in 1978 it became part of the British Commonwealth to which 
Australia also belongs.  
 
Though the conflict opposing Guadalcanalese and Malaitans is usually 
characterized as ethnic, the case could be made that economic factors 
weighed heavier than ethnic tensions. Prior to 1998 Malaitans had been 
moving to Guadalcanal for better economic opportunities. This trend can be 
traced back to the end of world war II when the establishment of Honiara (in 
Guadalcanal island) as the national capital initiated internal migration flows 
from all the islands but particularly from Malaita (Fullilove, 2006: 5). As a 
result, “Malaitans came to dominate Honiara and its circles of political and 
economic influence” (ibid.). The violence of 1998 was triggered by 
disagreements over resource distribution, particularly land issues, hence the 
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view that economic grievances eventually erupted into ethnic conflict. 
Through the years land was increasingly owned by Malaitans through a 
process of interethnic marriages and inheritances which favoured Malaitans 
over Guadalcanalese (Magalhães, 2008: 689). From 1998 to 2002 growing 
resentment evolved into organized violence. Some Guadalcanalese formed 
the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) which claimed to represent the native 
people of Guadalcanal. The IFM then started evicting Malaitans from their 
lands while accusing them of taking their jobs and lands (BBC, 2009). 
Malaitans eventually (1999) created the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), a militia 
group, as a response to IMF’s harassment (Fullilove, 2006: 5).  
 
As violence intensified, the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP, where 
Malaitans were the majority) became a third party to the fighting (2000). In 
April 2000, as violence peaked in Honiara, the government issued a 
“desperate plea for armed assistance from Australia and New Zealand” 
(Dinnen, 2002 apud Lambach, 2005: 13). Both countries declined the 
request and supported instead a Commonwealth monitoring and mediation 
effort (ibid.: 13). In June 2000 the MEF (with support from the RSIP) staged 
a coup and took the prime-minister, Bartholomew Ulufa'alu10, hostage (BBC, 
2009) while demanding that he resigns. Following a few months of low-level 
violence, Australia and New Zealand brokered the Townsville Peace 
Agreement in October 2000 and in December 2000 Mannasseh Sogavare was 
                                                            
10 Bartholomew Ulufa'alu, a Malaitan, had been elected for office in 1997.  
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voted as the new prime-minister. However, the peace agreement was short-
lived (coming to an end in October 2002) and, despite some immediate 
impact, implementation lagged behind stated intentions. According to 
Fullilove (2006: 6), “[e]thnic violence soon mutated into criminality and 
thuggery, including arson, rape, kidnap, looting, assault, shootings, torture, 
rape and extrajudicial executions; 150 or 200 weapons-related deaths are 
thought to have occurred”.  
 
Other attempts at ending the violence were made, but there was a growing 
sense of lawlessness while the economy also deteriorated significantly. In 
March 2002 prime-minister Allan Kemakeza (elected in December 2001) 
issued another request to Australia and New Zealand asking for “overseas 
police to work alongside Solomon Islands officers” (Dinnen, 2002 apud 
Lambach, 2005: 13), but the request was again turned down. In the face of 
increasing anarchy, prime-minister Allan Kemakeza again requested 
Australia’s assistance in April 200311 (Amnesty International, 2004 apud 
Lambach, 2005: 13). This time Australia was receptive to the Solomons 
request. After Kemakeza visited his counterpart in Canberra, on 5 June John 
Howard gave him the Framework for Strengthened Assistance to Solomon 
Islands which outlined an Australian-led mission (Fullilove, 2006: 7). A 
regional assistance mission was then created in the framework of Operation 
                                                            
11 June 2003 according to BBC’s online timeline of events.  
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Helpem Fren12: the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands 
(ibid.: 7). 
 
                                                            
12 Helpem Fren is pidgin English for ‘helping friends’.  
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2.4.2. RAMSI – characteristics and performance  
 
RAMSI was originally lauded as a success not only for its structure but also 
for its immediate achievements. In fact, RAMSI’s ‘model’ was chosen by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development as a case study for 
a “pilot study on principles for good international engagement in fragile 
states” (Powles, 2006: 9). Such was its original success that a renowned 
Australian minister argued that “a RAMSI-type intervention should form the 
template for a future United Nations intervention in East Timor” (ibid.).   
 
A number of features make this mission unique. RAMSI was a preventive, 
rather than reactive, state-building mission. John Howard justified the 
intervention to the Australian parliament on these grounds: “If we do nothing 
and the Solomon Islands becomes a failed state (…) potential exploitation of 
that situation by drug dealers, money launderers, international terrorism (…) 
will make the inevitable dealing with the problem in the future more costly, 
more difficult” (Howard, 2003 apud Kabutaulaka, 2004: 5, emphasis added). 
In mid-2003, though the Solomons government was weakened and low-level 
violence pervasive, it had not yet failed according to the Australian 
authorities.  
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The intervention was officially taken to avert an imminent state failure 
scenario. Indeed, according to R. Ponzio (2005 apud Fullilove, 2006: 11),  
 
[The mission] arguably broke new ground in lowering the threshold for intervention 
in the indisputably internal affairs of a sovereign state (…). To a degree not 
witnessed in international peacekeeping, insidious levels of crime, corruption and 
poor governance had become a primary impetus for external intervention, rather 
than a large humanitarian crisis.  
 
In just a few months, direct intervention in other countries became an 
acceptable and necessary foreign policy tool.  
 
Ensuring the consent of both the government and the population was critical 
to cast the intervention as legitimate. To that end a number of steps were 
taken: (1) an endorsement by the Pacific Islands Forum foreign ministers 
meeting on 30 June13; (2) a formal request/explicit invitation for a regional 
assistance package by Solomons’ governor-general; (3) approval by the 
Solomons parliament; and (4) a formal agreement between the participating 
                                                            
13 Schoefield points out that RAMSI fits with the kind of political emergencies envisaged in 
the Pacific Island Forum’s Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security adopted in 2002 
following strong pressure by Canberra. The declaration referred to the possibility of 
“immediate and sustained regional action in response to the current regional security 
environment”. Schoefield suggests that given the subsequent course of events the Nasonini 
declaration was unusually timely (Schoefield, 2005). 
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countries. The mission was also endorsed by the UN and consistent with 
chapter VIII of the charter14 (Fullilove, 2006: 14). 
 
These steps were also meant to deflect potential accusations of 
neocolonialism, a charge to which the Australian government was particularly 
sensitive (Wainwright, 2003). Ensuring the host country’s consent would be 
one of the conditions attached to Australia’s regional engagement thereafter; 
in Downer’s own words (2007) “we work with the countries of the Pacific. We 
do not impose ourselves. We work with countries when they want to work 
with us”. At that point it was also critical to differentiate Operation Helpem 
Fren from Operation Iraqi Freedom and to ensure UN support by complying 
with the principle of non-intervention (article 2(7) of the UN charter) 
(Fullilove, 2006: 11).  
 
It follows from the last point that this operation had the Pacific Islands 
Forum blessing. It was framed by the Biketawa Declaration of 2000 and by 
the Nasonini Declaration of 2002. Furthermore, eleven Pacific states 
contributed to the mission’s staff which not only ensured legitimacy but also 
had practical advantages as a result of cultural affinities. Thus, the mission 
was able to ‘draw on expertise from around the region and lessen concerns 
                                                            
14 No attempts were made to bring the issue to the Security Council’s agenda, which 
underscores the regional nature of the mission. 
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in the region and beyond about Australian heavy-handedness (Wainwright, 
2003: 494). Support also came form Australia’s traditional allies, US and UK. 
  
But some critics pointed out that the PIF was largely dominated by Australia 
and that of the 2225 workers involved 1745 were Australian (nearly 80 
percent) (Kaiser, n/a: 11). Others saw the participation of other countries as 
no more than an attempt to “give a veneer of legitimacy to the Solomons 
exercise” (WSWS, 2003).  
 
RAMSI also had a non-sovereign matrix; it was strictly established as an 
“assistance package” or a “framework for strengthened assistance” - not a 
transitional administration as in East Timor and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where 
the missions’ form of authority was direct governance. RAMSI’s publicity 
material stated that “RAMSI does not control the government or make 
national decisions on behalf of Solomon Islands. The [p]arliament, 
[g]overnment, constitutional office holders and the public service all remain 
responsible for exercising their respective functions, and they remain 
accountable to the people of the Solomon Islands” (apud Fullilove, 2006: 
15). Therefore, because technically RAMSI does not have supervisory 
powers, it is “all about regime maintenance, not regime change” (ibid.).  
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However, RAMSI does have significant leverage in managing the country, 
mainly through the employment of police and officials in line (vs. staff) 
positions. These are Australian expatriates who hold high-level decision-
making posts, such as accountant-general (ibid.). They are often at the top 
of the chain of command and have de facto responsibility for critical 
governing choices.  
 
This particular feature also garnered a lot of criticism. There was nothing 
inevitable in choosing line positions; advisory posts could have been an 
alternative. Kaiser (n/a: 13) notes that Australia imported around 80 
bureaucrats to the Solomons government, particularly to economic 
ministries. (At one point the minister of finance himself was an employee of 
the Australian government). An early 2006 article in The Economist 
concluded that “Australian officials do dominate the Solomons, in effect 
running the islands’ finance ministry, central bank and police force”. As a 
result, among Solomon Islanders, RAMSI was increasingly being seen as a 
shadow government (Powles, 2006: 13). 
 
The intervention proceeded in two phases: the first, more immediate, aimed 
at restoring law and order and achieving stability in the territory while the 
second, long-term, was about statebuilding (Wainwright, 2003: 495). It was 
assumed that a police-led (rather than military-led) mission was more 
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suitable to address the nature of the violence in the Solomons. This was a 
reversal of the traditional sequence of interventions in that typically the 
military stabilize the territory first and once that is achieved police forces 
take over while the military step back. RAMSI did include a reasonable 
military force at the time of entry, but its focus was clearly civil which was in 
keeping with the perceived nature of the problem – an incipient civil war 
(Fullilove, 2006: 17).  
 
The original idea was to create a regional but nationally-led mission. Still, 
despite all the formalities, RAMSI and Australia have become increasingly 
indistinguishable. From the beginning RAMSI was defined by Australia and 
implemented in its own terms. Australian money also kept the mission 
running. Supporters of this model have stressed the advantages of the one-
country leadership (increased efficiency, simple mandate, quick deployment, 
shared work ethic, better coordination) as well as Australia’s comparative 
advantages (ibid.: 12-14).  But it has also contributed to ongoing criticism 
and suspicion over Australia’s real interests in the Solomons and in the 
Pacific (see for example WSWS, 2003; Skeers, 2006; Kaiser, 2005). For 
example, Magalhães (2007: 692-693) contests the real motives behind 
Canberra’s assertiveness in the Solomons, suggesting that economic causes, 
specifically the search for additional resources, trumped security or even 
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altruistic ones15. The same author further hints at the possibility that this 
kind of mission may actually encourage the kind of problems which it is 
supposed to fix, thereby generating a “vicious cycle of permanent insolvency 
and inescapable dependency” (ibid.).   
 
The mission has also been criticized for taking too narrow a view of its own 
mandate. Indeed, critics say that restoring law and order has been 
accomplished at the expense of achieving peace and security. As a result of 
the emphasis on stopping violence and criminality – areas in which the 
mission was largely successful - the underlying causes of the conflict were 
neglected. The original view was that “[one of RAMSI’s role] is to help create 
a stable environment in which Solomon Islanders themselves can take 
forward the task of peace and reconciliation, at their own pace, on 
accordance with their own customs and traditions” (Batley, 2006 apud 
Powles, 2006: 10-11). But this approach failed to recognize that “’order’ is 
not the same as ‘peace’ and that the absence of overt violence is not the 
same as the presence of active peace”16 (ibid.: 11). The prominence of what 
one Solomon Islander called “conflict-neutral statebuilding” (ibid.: 13) has 
led to what is perhaps the main criticism leveled against the mission: that it 
should have aimed to restore “not only a functional state, but also a 
                                                            
15 The Solomons are endowed with gold, timber and large fishing areas. Its gold mines have 
been operated by an Australian company whose royalties in 1998 were the same as after 
RAMSI was deployed when the mines reopened (in 2005 the figure was 3 percent). 
16 Unlike many of its counterparts, RAMSI did not include a peacebuilding unit.  
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functional society” (Kabutaulaka, 2004: 7). In other words, deep-seated 
issues related to resource and income inequalities have not been properly 
addressed because of the absolute priority accorded to the creation of a 
Western-style state. As a result RAMSI may be but an interregnum, albeit a 
really long one.  
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2.5. Australia and East Timor 
 
2.5.1. First act: InterFET 
 
With the fall of Indonesia’s New Order, Suharto’s demise opened a window 
of opportunity for East Timorese emancipation; his successor, B.J. Habibie, 
proved more receptive to reaching a settlement.  
 
In what is perhaps an attempt to rewrite history, Australian politicians have 
taken credit for and promoted the idea that, despite its unswerving 
complicity with the Indonesian occupation, it was Australia that saved East 
Timor from Indonesia. A particular piece of evidence has been used to 
support this argument; in 1998 Howard sent a letter to his Indonesian 
counterpart suggesting a way out of Indonesia’s East Timorese conundrum. 
While Howard did recommend arranging a self-determination act through 
which the East Timorese could have a say either for or against integration, 
he argued that it should be several years before such an act could take 
place; the point was not to press for independence but rather to buy 
Indonesia more time (Fernandes, 2004: 38-39) on the assumption that the 
East Timorese would eventually give in. Howard’s letter backfired when 
Habibie unexpectedly decided to hold a popular consultation in 1999, 
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claiming that Australia’s move – which had been perceived by the Jakarta 
elite and its powerful military as Canberra’s meddling in Indonesia’s internal 
affairs - weighed heavily in his decision (ABC, 2008b). Australia then had to 
move into ‘improvisation mode’ as its original plan was now at odds with the 
events on the ground. Still, thereafter Australia would take credit for 
prompting the referendum.  
 
When the East Timorese overwhelmingly voted against becoming Indonesia’s 
27th province, Jakarta withdrew from the territory though not without 
warning its other insubordinate provinces about what to expect should they 
insist on breaking away from the central state. After the independence ballot, 
pro-integration militias went on a rampage with the tacit support of the 
Indonesian army, taking hundreds of lives in over a month. International 
pressure eventually persuaded Habibie to allow for an Australian-led 
multinational peacekeeping force in the framework of the UN. InterFET – 
Australia’s first intervention in East Timor - would be largely successful in 
neutralizing militia violence. It also added credibility to Australia’s claim of 
holding primary responsibility for liberating East Timor.  
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 2.5.2. Post-independence tensions 
 
Tensions between Canberra and Dili in the post-independence period can be 
grouped into three categories: resource distribution (oil and gas reserves in 
the Timor gap), economic priorities (disagreement over the benefits of the 
demo-liberal model), and foreign policy (diversification of foreign 
relationships).  
 
After independence East Timorese leaders decided not to take on Indonesia’s 
obligations under the Timor gap treaty, choosing instead to negotiate a new 
treaty with Australia. This entailed agreeing on the maritime boundaries, 
which in turn would have important implications for revenue sharing. In 
March 2002 Australia formally rejected international arbitration over maritime 
boundaries by “[excluding them] from compulsory dispute settlements in the 
International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea” (King, 2007: 46).  
 
This decision cast a shadow on Australia’s intentions in the negotiations and 
it raised concerns about Australia’s good faith. Indeed, Canberra was well 
aware that if the issue was taken to international arbitration East Timor 
would be in advantage given current maritime law. Downer justified this 
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option by saying that “Australia’s strong view is that any maritime boundary 
dispute is best settled by negotiation rather than litigation” but Alkatiri 
described the act as “unfriendly” (ibid.). This early episode drove a wedge 
between both leaders and would partly set the tone for the relationship.  
 
As negotiations dragged on (given Canberra’s refusal to meet more than 
twice a year for lack of funding) and got tougher (with harsh exchanges 
between Alkatiri and Downer), East Timor was able to turn the emerging 
failed states security discourse to its own benefit in anticipation of the alarm 
that this would raise in Canberra. The president was the first to put forward 
the possibility of East Timor becoming a failed state if Australia was not 
willing to compromise on the negotiations and allow East Timor a higher and 
fairer share of the revenues: 
 
We will end up being just one more failed state, one more country for whom 
independence proved to be just a dream. (Harding, 2004) 
It makes the difference to our future. We would not like to be a failed state. Without 
all this we will be another Haiti, another Liberia, another Solomon Islands, and we 
do not want that. (Fickling, 2004 apud Lambach, 2004: 21) 
 
He also added fuel to the fire by equating the negotiations to the Indonesian 
occupation: “We are only in the fourth year of confrontation with Australia. If 
you compare that with our previous fight, we would now be 1979…” 
(Gusmão, 2004) adding that with the revenues from one of the main fields 
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“[East Timor] would be a donor as well. [It] would be able to help other 
islands in the Pacific too” (ibid.).  
 
Prime minister and foreign affairs minister also jumped on the bandwagon:  
 
Is Australia governed by the rule of law or not? Their tactics are very clear. Australia 
knows that these revenues are vital for us. I am very surprised by their attitude. I 
never thought a democratic country like Australia would play this kind of role with a 
poor neighbor (Alkatiri apud King, 2007: 53). 
 
We will mobilize Nobel peace prize winners around the world to talk about this issue, 
people in Hollywood, in LA, Nelson Mandela, Desmond Tutu, everyone that I have 
been in touch with already! It will be one of the most intense campaigns the world 
has seen since the apartheid campaign! (Horta apud King, 2007: 61).  
 
In short, East Timorese leaders aimed at getting additional bargaining power 
by threatening Australia with its own state failure and ‘[using] the new 
security discourse in the region as a rhetorical tool in the diplomatic back-
and-forth’ (Lambach, 2005: 21). This strategy was complemented by a few 
others: 
 
1. Enhancing comparisons - use of comparisons to local (South Pacific) 
and external (African) state failure cases; equation between East 
Timor’s previous struggle with Indonesia and its current struggle with 
Australia (both viewed as ‘occupiers’, of land and sea respectively). 
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2. Moral argument – repeated reference to the huge wealth gap 
separating East Timor and Australia; portrayal of the negotiations as a 
David vs. Goliath struggle; calls for Australia’s inherent sense of 
fairness (the Australian fair go) in view of such an unbalanced fight. 
3. Popular mobilization – revival of resistance-era networks; media 
campaigns led by grassroots movements.  
 
Not surprisingly Downer derided this sentimental, public relations campaign: 
 
 I don’t think that the tactic of strident rhetoric and denunciation of Australia – 
accusations of greed and ill faith and so on – I don’t think that tactic in the end, 
which is a big surprise for us after all we’ve done for East Timor, I don’t think that is 
going to prove very successful. (ABC, 2004) 
 
And he would go on to say that East Timor “made a very big mistake 
thinking the best way to handle this negotiation is by trying to shame 
Australia, by mounting abuse on our country, accusing us of bullying, when 
you consider all we’ve done for East Timor” (Lambach, 2005: 21). 
 
A second area of friction concerned the prime minister’s economic 
governance. The widespread view, largely inflated by the Australian media, 
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was that the Fretilin government was essentially “a clique of retrograde 
Stalinists left over from the [cold war] era who lived it up in Mozambique for 
twenty-four years” (Hill, 2003: 1). The prime minister, in particular, was 
regularly derided as socialist, communist, inept, unreasonable, wary of 
Australia, unappreciative of its liberating role, etc. (Kelly, 2006a; Kelly, 
2006b).  
 
In the economic front Alkatiri’s development priorities often clashed with 
what Australia and the World Bank thought more appropriate for the country. 
Whereas the prime minister favored a pro-poor approach, prioritizing 
initiatives on food security and poverty alleviation, and generally supported 
the state’s provision of public goods, Australia and the World Bank dismissed 
this approach arguing that the government should step back and encourage 
private entrepreneurship and the natural workings of the market. This is 
most clear in the disagreement over agricultural policy. Australia and the 
World Bank refused to financially support the rehabilitation of the East 
Timorese rice industry which would reduce food vulnerability and import-
dependence (Anderson, n/a).  
 
Another choice which did not go over too well with Australia was Alkatiri’s 
determination not to take loans from the international financial institutions as 
many other post-conflict countries had done, including Mozambique, usually 
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with disastrous results. Thus, East Timor acquired the singular status of 
being one of the poorest yet debt-free countries in the world (Parreira, 2004: 
227). Alkatiri was also praised, and occasionally criticized, for setting up East 
Timor’s petroleum fund and for his conservative management of the oil and 
gas reserves. 
 
At the same time Alkatiri tried to diversify East Timor’s foreign relations 
presumably to make up for Australia’s dominance. Anderson (2006: 69) 
points out that “the AusAID and World Bank preference for ‘corporate 
welfare’ and privatization schemes, often at add [sic] with East Timorese 
priorities [is partly responsible for the government seeking to] diversify its 
trade, aid and investment partners”. In addition to consolidating its 
engagement with the former colonial power, Alkatiri also developed ties with 
Cuba in the health sector, which did not please Australia or the US for that 
matter (ibid.). Some went as far as to suggest that the Cuban connection 
illustrated “a foreign policy overtly confrontational to the West” (Horta, 2006 
apud ibid.). In trying to diversify the country’s oil contracts, Alkatiri also 
developed a Chinese connection relying heavily on China’s technical 
expertise. (Add to China Norway, Italy and India). Alkatiri’s moves effectively 
brought new players, particularly China, into a hitherto exclusively Australian 
sphere of influence (ibid.: 70) which of course did not sit well with Australia’s 
long-held policy of strategic denial.  
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2.5.3. Second act: ‘The crisis’ and the ISF 
 
The 2006 crisis in East Timor is hard to tag. Depending on one’s own 
preferences, the causes can be endogenous or exogenous, cultural or 
geopolitical, ‘pessimistic’ or ‘ethnographically sensitive’, mainstream or 
alternative. Either way there is some agreement on how it started.  
 
From 2002 to 2006 sporadic violence became somewhat common in East 
Timor. Internal security deteriorated during that time, culminating in the 
April-May 2006 violence in Dili. Never before since independence had the 
country so seriously been on the brink of what seemed to be a civil war. In 
January 2006, 159 soldiers sent a petition to the president “complaining of 
discrimination against westerners in recruitment, promotions and disciplinary 
measures” (ICG, 2006: 6). The rationale for the discrimination was that 
lorosaes (easterners) had fought harder against the Indonesians than 
loromonos (westerners) who allegedly had been more cooperative with the 
Indonesians. The petitioners were allowed to demonstrate in Dili from 24 to 
28 April, but in the last day of protests violence erupted in the capital. The 
second peak of violence occurred in May 25 when soldiers opened fire over 
policemen, killing 9 (ICG, 2006: 9-10). This episode illustrated the 
confrontational logic opposing both forces since their inception. The military 
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demonstrations then evolved into a large-scale social protest against the 
government.  
 
Although it seemed to have started out as a military issue, the crisis also 
brought to the fore underlying institutional problems. Specifically, the 
constitutional distribution of power between president and prime minister 
was seen as imbalanced. The semi-presidential system assigned executive 
power to the prime minister leaving the president with a largely symbolic 
role. This rather limited job description did not go over well with X. Gusmão 
– himself widely perceived as “Australia’s man” (Keady, 2006). While there 
already were resistance-era ideological differences between both leaders, 
these were further compounded by the Portuguese-inspired semi-presidential 
system (Shoesmith, 2003 apud Feijó, 2006: 55). Add to this the politicization 
of the military and the police forces, with the former siding with the 
president and the latter with the prime minister.  
 
Disagreements within the leadership also led to the high profile circulation of 
coup theses. According to the softer version, the coup was essentially 
institutional - the president actively trying to discredit, delegitimize and 
eventually overthrow the prime minister, possibly with foreign (read: 
Australian) support. The other version bluntly affirms Canberra’s role in 
bringing down the Fretilin government.  
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Yet another view suggests that Fretilin and its leader actually brought failure 
on themselves by promoting “an authoritarian Mozambique-style suppression 
of opposition and freedom of speech” (Siapno, n/a). The re-introduction of 
the defamation law, parliament’s rubber-stamping role, the asphyxiating role 
of Fretilin and concomitant weakness of the multi-party system, the 
politicization of the administrative system as well as Alkatiri’s own ‘arrogant 
and exclusionary’ style are often cited as evidence of “the government’s top-
down, non-inclusive way of doing politics” which combined with “limited 
transparency and little tolerance for criticism [formed] a political culture that 
[was] not conducive to nationbuilding and the rooting of democratic 
practices” in the country (Simonsen, 2006: 584). 
 
Last but not least, other authors have emphasized the importance of viewing 
the 2006 and pre-2006 events from a more people-centered, 
ethnographically sensitive perspective. Arguing that standard accounts of 
conflict “privilege globalizing discourses [that] extract [and abstract] the 
subjective experience of violence”, Devant (2007) sees rumor-activated 
internal displacement not just as a consequence but as a major cause of the 
2006 violence (ibid.: 20). In a similar vein, Seixas points out that regardless 
of all the unit- and agent-level explanations, on the ground the crisis was 
primarily understood (and experienced) as cultural: east vs. west, lorosaes 
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vs. lormonus (Seixas, 2007) and that should be the starting point of any 
analysis. 
 
Australia’s response to the crisis followed a request from the East Timorese 
government to the government of Australia. While other countries responded 
to the government’s plea with civil or paramilitary forces (most notably 
Portugal), Australia responded militarily, forming the International 
Stabilization Force (ISF) (along with New Zealand). This generated a 
somewhat ambiguous situation where the various foreign forces coexist and 
share essentially the same duties, thought ultimately reporting to their own 
governments. Australia’s department of defence sums up the ISF mission as 
follows: “International police from Australia and 20 other nations provide 
security in Dili as part of the United Nations Police Force. The ISF provides 
support to these police operations as required.” This is what sets apart the 
ISF and InterFET.  
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2.6. Conclusions 
 
By now the parallels between Australia’s intervention in SI and in ET should 
be clear. Both conflicts were interpreted according to the global frameworks 
in vogue - as local expressions of larger conflict trends. They signaled that 
the development malaise commonly associated with Africa had now reached 
the South Pacific as well. Indeed, in both cases the causes were perceived as 
primarily ethnic and institutional: in SI native Guadalcanalese fought migrant 
Malaitans; likewise, in ET lorosaes fought loromonos17. In both cases national 
institutions were not up to the challenge, indeed far from solving the conflict 
they made it worse: in SI the police force supported one of the factions while 
the executive branch was largely unresponsive; in ET clashes between police 
and army were exacerbated by power struggles between prime minister and 
president who in turn also politicized both forces. Following to the 
mainstream view, both conflicts can be neatly summarized as follows: in SI 
ethnic cleavages overflowed into the security sector (police only) going all 
the way up to the main state institutions; in ET the security sector (police 
and army) became increasingly polarized according to ethnic divisions which 
eventually affected the very foundations of the state. Therefore, the conflicts 
were diagnosed as a combination of three factors: ethnicity, failures in the 
security sector, and  institutional breakdown.  
                                                            
17 It might make more sense to think of these distinctions as regional/geographic rather than 
ethnic.  
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In view of these apparent similarities, Australia’s response to the violence in 
ET was also somewhat akin to its intervention in SI. First, it required an 
explicit and consensual request by the East Timorese leaders; as with SI, this 
was presumably a formal guarantee against future legitimacy issues. Second, 
once again Australia responded with force (military and police deployment) 
to problems which were in fact socially, culturally and politically rooted. Both 
interventions addressed symptoms rather than underlying causes (ALP, n/a), 
which is in keeping with the prevalent interpretation of the conflicts. Third, in 
both cases the operations were conducted outside of the UN framework. As 
mentioned earlier, this is what sets apart InterFET and the ISF and it is also 
symbolic of the drift towards an interventionist agenda. While InterFET was 
UN-sanctioned, this time Australia refused to have its troops placed under UN 
command, which again is in line with its role in SI.  
 
In the case of ET that has resulted in a peculiar situation where foreign 
security forces operate without any reference to the UN’s mandate (Feijó, 
n/a). Instead, they are bilateral assistance missions accountable to their own 
countries first and foremost, with marginal articulation with the UN. This 
particular issue – the nature of command – is an ongoing source of tension 
as the forces’ conduct occasionally reflects their countries competing 
agendas. Moreover, Australia’s refusal to place its soldiers under international 
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command has led to suggestions that this was just another instance of 
Australia mimicking the US, who operates on the same basis (Hill, 2003). To 
do so in Southeast Asia further brings into question Australia’s motivations 
because “it is one thing to have command over a body like RAMSI, in a 
region of micro-states, (…) to do the same (…) in Southeast Asia is quite 
different” (ibid.).  
 
Another important difference is that whereas in both cases Australia’s 
response was of the ‘law and order’ kind, in SI it was more law (police-led) 
but in ET more order (military-led). This is somewhat puzzling given the 
conflicts alleged similarities and Australia’s earlier argument that ET would be 
better off with a strong police force rather than an army (Wainwright, 2002).  
 
Both interventions took place in an international environment conducive to 
foreign interventions. First, as we have seen earlier, a number of emerging 
concepts engendered largely negative, even stereotyped, representations of 
the region: Africanization, state failure, arc of instability, war on terror and of 
course the Petri dish metaphor. Second, in pursuing a more assertive stance 
in the region Australia was merely ‘leading by example’ as the precedent had 
already been set by the US. Thus, Australia’s new approach was only 
possible because of larger changes in the global security discourse.  
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Chief amongst them were the different perceptions of risk associated with 
state fragility. As with SI, Canberra’s intervention in ET was also motivated 
by a new perception of threat in its immediate region. These are what 
Downer (2005: 7) called ‘contemporary threats’, with failed states on top of 
the list, seen as “incubators of crime, people, gun and drug smuggling and 
potentially terrorism” (O’Connor et al., 2006: 177) that could directly affect 
Australian interests and Australia itself. Australia’s foreign policy reappraisal, 
and its implementation, was therefore motivated by this new reality.  
 
But this was perhaps not as real as it was purported to be. Indeed, there 
was scant empirical evidence to support the view that lawlessness, chaos, 
terrorism and all sorts of transnational illicit activities were about to fall down 
on ET or SI. Instead, the threat was constructed preventively by external 
actors, in this case Australia, who saw itself as the only country with a 
“major and unique stake” in the region (Wainwright, 2003). Therefore 
determining the nature of the threat, while ignoring the actual conditions on 
the ground or how the population sees itself, is of course a privilege available 
to the most powerful. The threat exists in the eyes of the beholder; it is 
inherently subjective and speculative. However, when events on the ground 
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seem to conform with the original forecast this is taken as evidence of 
Australia’s foresightedness.18 
 
Canberra “did not act to stop a specified security threat, but to contain the 
potential for unknown risks to proliferate” (Hameiri, 2008: 361). Therefore 
“intervention (…) emerged out of a perception that it is more effective to 
contain transnational risks away from Australia” (ibid.), which suggests that 
standard neo-imperialist or neo-colonial interpretations of Australia’s 
interventionism may be missing the mark. Indeed, Australian politicians seem 
to endorse the view of violence as development in reverse or warped 
development (Devant, 2007: 13) which assumes that development 
progresses linearly and is inherently good and that violence not only disrupts 
but reverts the development flow. Therefore violence/conflict – of the kind 
which affected both SI and ET – represents a relapse into underdevelopment 
which in turn is dangerous for Australia. Through this circular logic, 
Australia’s security interests are indefinitely linked to both countries’ 
development prospects (Hameiri, 2008: 361).  
 
                                                            
18 Thus Australia argued that, much like its Pacific counterparts, ET could do without an 
army but not without a capable gendarmerie because its most pressing security problems 
were internal rather than external (Wainwright, 2002: 25). The early decision to create both 
a defence and a police force ran contrary to Australia’s interests. The 2006 crisis confirmed 
Canberra’s assessment that their creation would generate a ‘legal and political minefield’ 
with serious overlap and command issues (ibid.) which could overflow into other 
governmental areas, as indeed it did. 
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With what seemed to be latent civil wars, SI and ET were seen as on the 
verge of collapse. Government, media, and academia converged in that 
assessment. However, while for the SI this was a result of structural 
problems, for ET it stemmed from ‘bad’ government, ‘bad’ post-
independence policy choices. Howard himself said that “The country has not 
been well governed” (Público, 2006). But Alkatiri’s governance was not bad 
so much as different. Hill (2006) points out that “Timor [was] much more in 
control of its own decision-making than any other small countries in the 
Pacific where Australian consultants [had been] brought in to make those 
decisions”. The prime minister’s firm stance in the oil negotiations, his 
resistance to fully comply with neoliberal prescriptions, and the pursuit of 
friendly relations with other countries were contrary to Australia’s own 
interests. Thus, Alkatiri represented a political project at odds with Australia’s 
vision for the region.  
 
Within this framework, the prime minister’s unorthodox choices did not sit 
well with its mighty neighbor. Indeed, with Alkatiri in charge ET became a 
pebble in Canberra’s shoe. As a result, Australia favoured – some would say 
supported – a change of government. At the same time, Australia’s 
command over the ISF, bypassing the UN, gives it major clout in the 
country’s economic and political evolution. The same thing applies to SI but 
on a wider scale.  
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These cases illustrate a larger trend in contemporary post-conflict scenarios, 
notably that political authorities often have to prioritize governance over 
government. In the process they become more accountable to external 
actors than to the very constituency that elected them in the first place. This 
generates a democratic deficit in that the agenda that the government ran 
on is highly conditioned by non-national players. More importantly, it 
deliberately circumscribes what should be discretionary political choices. The 
normal political process, indeed politics itself, is thus denied from the top 
inasmuch as alternatives are not really available and, if they are, they are 
largely predetermined. It is, by extension, a denial of the self-determination 
which many of these countries fought for.  
 
Australia’s response to these countries security problems also reveals a 
strong alignment with the liberal peace project: the belief that “a strong dose 
of orthodox development policy (good governance, democratization, 
privatization, and economic deregulation) will cure the problem of violent 
conflict” as these features “will [naturally] release the (…) peaceable nature 
of human society” (Constance, n/a). Therefore the goal is not purely 
economic or colonial-wise; as one author put it, Australia’s interventions in 
fragile states “[are not] motivated by neo-liberal messianic fervor for 
extending liberal markets to all” (Hameiri, 2008: 365); such interpretations 
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may be missing the point. Instead, they suggest that supporting the 
establishment of the right kind of government in its periphery is not only 
inherently good for those countries but will also contribute to the overall goal 
of managing the risks of state fragility for Australia. In other words, 
statebuilding, as practiced by Australia, is an inherently political process 
presented as no more than a managerial or technocratic enterprise. 
Accordingly, it amounts to an attempt “to exercise influence over the form 
and quality of governance in the Pacific without assuming responsibility for 
the fate of these countries” (Hameiri, 2006: opinion; Pureza, 2008).   
 
Going back to the original question, then, what explains Australia’s new 
interventionism in the Pacific is a different perception of the risks associated 
with state fragility. The statebuilding response can be seen as a foreign-
induced form of advancing a particular way of governing which in the long 
run will ensure the inductor’s homeland security. This view, which has now 
become hegemonic, can be traced back to liberal theory, according to which 
the combination of economic integration and democratic systems will 
decrease the incentives for waging war and eventually bring about a more 
peaceful world.  
 
One could expect that since this was the policy followed in its immediate 
neighborhood, Australia’s policy towards Asia would be at least partly 
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informed by the same tenets. That is not the case. Indeed, whereas in the 
South Pacific Australia’s approach is more consistent with a neoliberal 
framework, in Asia it is downright realist. Both fronts thus seem to be at 
opposing ends, which suggests a highly pragmatic foreign policy. The next 
chapter looks into Australia’s relations with three particular countries – US, 
China, Japan – to ascertain this.  
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Part 3: The quest for security from Asia 
 
This chapter zooms out of the South Pacific to focus on the North and East 
Asia region, which forms Australia’s region of secondary strategic interest 
(Rumley, 2006: 37). It reviews Australia’s relations with three particular 
countries – US, China, and to a lesser extent Japan – in order to contrast 
Canberra’s approach to the ‘region to the north’ with that towards its 
immediate neighborhood. In the process it illustrates how Australia’s foreign 
policy acquired an increasingly dissimilar form, based on opposing threat 
perceptions, which nonetheless converged in the overall goal of achieving 
security despite ‘abnormality’.   
 
We have seen earlier how, following the US lead, Canberra’s policies towards 
the South Pacific drew inspiration from the post-9/11 security discourse. In 
particular we have seen how the belief that, then as now, ‘threats are 
defined more by the fault lines within societies than by the territorial 
boundaries between sates’ (Reiss, 2004) has informed Australia’s response to 
rising instability in its self-assigned sphere of influence. Given the huge 
power differentials between both regions, it is unsurprising that Australia 
took a significantly different approach to its Northeast Asian neighbours. The 
result, however, was an increasingly dual foreign policy, which skillfully 
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combined neoliberal/institutional motivations in its South Pacific front with 
traditional realist tenets with the Northeast Asian region.  
  
87 
 
3.1. Australia and the US: A match made in heaven?  
 
In order to understand Australia’s choices regarding Asia, one must first look 
at its links with the US. As the region’s superseding power and Australia’s 
foremost bilateral relationship, Canberra’s ties with Washington have both 
assisted and constrained Australia’s performance. 
 
During the Howard years there was an explicit, some would say forceful, 
attempt to reinvigorate Australia’s alliance with the US which, since the end 
of world war II, had been framed by the ANZUS19 treaty. The alliance may 
have seen better days (considering Keating-Evans’s emphasis on 
engagement with Asia) but it was far from waning. Still, Howard believed 
that Labor’s insistence on joining the (Asian) club had gone too far and was 
contrary to Australia’s national interest: not only did it compromise the 
relationship with the US since it placed near exclusive emphasis in Asia (with 
mixed results at best) but, more importantly, the push for engagement also 
compromised Australia’s own identity (Kelly, 2006: 27), which had to adjust 
                                                            
19 Originally a trilateral treaty (1951) through which the US extended a security guarantee to 
Australia and New Zealand. In 1987 New Zealand refused to allow US nuclear ships onto its 
ports. As a result the US suspended its security ‘obligation’ towards New Zealand pending 
future reassessment by Wellington. Subsequently the alliance would only bind Australia and 
the US (plus Australia and New Zealand), though the acronym remained. It should be noted, 
however, that the American security guarantee is only presumed since the treaty’s concision 
(11 articles) and vague wording do not unambiguously guarantee much besides 
‘consultation in the event of an attack’ (Phillips, 2004: 55; Siracusa, 2006: 40). It does, 
however, retain important dissuasive power. For more on this and other myths surrounding 
the alliance see Phillips, 2004.  
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so that Australia could at last go from ‘odd man out’ to ‘odd man in’ 
(Huntington, 1996: 152). On Howard’s different approach to Asia, the 2003 
foreign policy and defense white paper stated that “Australia goes out to the 
region not as a supplicant but as a partner” (DFAT, 2003: 85) – such was 
Howard’s understanding of Labor’s engagement.  
 
As a cultural traditionalist (Kelly, 2006: 23-30), Howard’s faith in the US 
alliance can be partly understood as a reaction to Keating-Evans’s perceived 
concessions on Australia’s ‘Australianness’. But it also stems from a 
fundamental strategic belief in the enduring strength of America’s leadership: 
“the US will remain the pre-eminent global power for the foreseeable future” 
(DFAT, 2003: 87, 21). This idea, repeatedly stated, is important as it 
reinforces Australia’s positioning on the US’s side in the event of open 
confrontation in North Asia, a critical region “where the interests of key 
global players intersect” (ibid: 76; DoD, 2000: IX). Not only did Howard-
Downer believe in the long-term sustainability of America’s power but they 
also actively supported US presence in the Asia-Pacific. The official view was 
that the best way to achieve stability in the region had been and would still 
be through the presence of the American hegemon: “US strategic 
engagement and alliances underpin the security of the region and help 
manage rivalries between its powers” (DFAT, 2003: 22; Downer, 2005: 9). 
Thus, not only did Australia actively endorse US presence in the region, it 
also regarded it as inherently benign.      
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From the start then Howard reprioritized the alliance with the US, capitalizing 
on the opportunities created by a new administration (Bush II proved more 
receptive to Howard’s moves than Clinton) and by a favorable strategic 
environment (brought about by the war on terror). Within this framework 
Canberra fully supported Washington’s post-9/11 retaliation efforts, first by 
immediately invoking the ANZUS treaty20 (before NATO had even done so) 
and then by pledging Australian troops and military expertise to America’s 
long-term war efforts21. Indeed, such was Canberra and Washington’s like-
mindedness that some authors even questioned whether, as with the US, the 
Howard government had also taken a neoconservative turn (Koo, 2005: n/a).  
 
The ‘special relationship’, as Howard would dub it, also progressed on the 
economic front. As a middle power with only moderate leverage in major 
international economic fora, Australian governments realized early on that it 
had more to win by joining and even heading a “rules-based multilateral 
system” (Ravenhill, 2001: 256) than by remaining attached to the ‘system of 
                                                            
20 Based on the principle of collective defense, according to which an attack on any of the 
members is an attack on all of them, with expectations of reciprocal assistance.  
21 The extent of Australia’s commitment is debatable. Some authors argue that, far from 
misguided ‘pro-American romanticism’ (Kelly, 2006: 49), Howard’s seemingly unconditional 
support for US endeavors was actually the result of careful decision-making and that its 
contribution to the ‘coalition of the willing’ was largely tokenistic (Beeson, 2007: 597), 
thereby maximizing leverage while minimizing casualties – Australia’s alleged ‘way of war’ 
(Kelly: ?). According to them, Howard-Downer excelled at clever/cost-effective alliance 
management (Philips, 2004). Still, many more remain critical of what is often described as 
Australia’s ‘naïve loyalty’.  
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imperial preferences’, essentially remaining an outpost of the UK (ibid.: 249). 
Accordingly, Australia has consistently supported international trade 
liberalization, particularly in agriculture where it has competitive advantages. 
It was therefore somewhat puzzling that in 2004 it initiated negotiations for a 
free trade agreement (FTA) with the US22. The bilateral economic 
relationship had always been uneven: first, given the obvious differences in 
size, there were enduring asymmetries in that while for Australia the US was 
a major (though not the major) trade partner, for the US Australia had only 
marginal importance; likewise, the relationship was also characterized by a 
steady trade imbalance, i.e. Australia typically imported more from than 
exported to; finally, the US consistently imposed import restrictions (through 
tariff and non-tariff barriers) on goods produced more efficiently by Australia 
(ibid.: 252-253).  
 
According to most accounts, the FTA did little to improve this situation. 
Indeed, despite the government’s “[determination] to pursue pragmatically 
the advantages that free trade agreements offer Australia” (DFAT, 2003: 58, 
emphasis added), in this particular case pragmatism did not seem to take 
priority (see Manne, 2007). In many crucial segments (including dairy 
products, beef, sugar, manufactured and traded goods, pharmaceutical 
industry, intellectual property rights, etc.) the US was able to essentially 
maintain, and occasionally reinforce, its protectionist policies while Australia 
                                                            
22 The FTA (AUSFTA) came into force on January 1, 2005 (Vaughn, 2008: 12).  
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gained little additional access to the American market (ibid.). Furthermore, 
the free trade agreement was in essence a preferential trade agreement; as 
such it was discriminatory and non-rules based (Beeson, 2007: 600), 
meaning it favored the US to the detriment of Australia’s other Asian 
partners (Beeson, 2003: 7)23. However, the FTA with the US inaugurated a 
period of intensified bilateral trade diplomacy: Australia would also sign FTAs 
with Singapore (2003) and Thailand (2004) while pursuing similar deals with 
Japan, South Korea and even China (DFAT, 2003: 61-62)24. 
 
If the agreement was indeed so disappointing, why did Canberra give in to 
Washington’s whishes? Some claimed, depreciatively, that this FTA allowed 
Howard to “complete the process of Australia’s in-depth integration with the 
US” (Manne, 2007: n/a). But officially the push for a FTA was seen as an 
opportunity to “[raise] bilateral economic ties to a level commensurate with 
the security relationship” (DFAT, 2003: 89) which was presented as a major 
achievement. According to Beeson (2007: 601) 
 
                                                            
23 Officially, however, bilateral and multilateralism were mutually reinforcing. In fact, 
somewhat paradoxically, bilateralism was presented as advancing multilateralism: ‘The 
emphasis of the [g]overnment will remain on multilateral trade liberalization. But the 
[g]overnment’s active pursuit of regional and, in particular, bilateral liberalization will help 
set a high benchmark for the multilateral system. Liberalisation through these avenues can 
compete with and stimulate multilateral liberalisation’ (DFAT, 2003: 49).  
24 Trade was just one of the areas where the Howard government took an increasingly 
selective approach. Diplomatically Australia also prioritized bilateral over multilateral 
relationships, believing this strategy to be more manageable and yield better results. 
Accordingly, it made careful use of the UN system while also privileging issue-area 
collaborations and prioritizing functional affinities as the basis for relationships.  
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after investing so much political capital and direct military assistance in the 
bilateral relationship, the Howard government had little choice but to sign any 
agreement or risk the perception that the entire relationship was disadvantageous 
for Australia25’.  
 
Similarly, Capling (apud Manne, 2007: n/a) points out that this was the first 
time since the end of the imperial preferences system that “the trade policy 
of an Australian government had placed political and strategic considerations 
ahead of the nation’s commercial interests”.  
 
  
                                                            
25 Particularly since, around this time, US policy failure in Afghanistan and Iraq – therefore 
also Australia’s, who had thrown all its weight behind the US – was becoming increasingly 
conspicuous.  
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3.2. Australia and China: A balancing act  
 
To make sense of Australia’s policies towards China (indeed Australia’s entire 
foreign policy) one must bear in mind its relations with the US. Australia’s 
‘China dilemma’ is actually not specific to Australia and it illustrates larger 
trends in the contemporary international system. It can be roughly 
formulated as the need to choose between its geopolitical past (which lies 
with the US) and its economic future (which to a large extent lies with China) 
(Beeson, 2007: 603). The lingering question of whether China’s rise will be 
peaceful is of upmost importance for Australia.  
 
Canberra’s economic integration with Beijing was prompted by China’s 
growing energy needs. Given its large on- and offshore area, Australia had 
an important resource base which could in part provide China with the 
natural resources needed to sustain its unrivaled growth rates. Not only was 
China eager to buy and Australia keen on selling, but Beijing also badly 
wanted what Canberra had to offer – coal, iron ore and natural gas. As a 
result, there was growing talk of natural synergies, win-win relationships, 
complementary interests, untapped opportunities, strong market matches, 
and the like (Maxwell, 2006; ACCI, n/a).  
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While reaping the benefits of the new ‘strategic economic partnership’, 
Canberra essentially turned a blind eye to Beijing’s internal political 
developments. In other words, the undemocratic nature of the Chinese 
regime was largely overlooked for the sake of furthering “short term 
economic benefits” (Dibb, 2005: 17). Downer notably said that Australia’s 
approach to China should be “realistic [and not focus] relentlessly, 
intensively, and disproportionately on those matters where our experience 
and perspectives differ” (ibid.).    
 
Improved relations with China were therefore largely driven by mutual 
economic interests. But on the political front the relationship was less 
symbiotic, if at all. Juggling Australia’s Chinese and American connections 
proved challenging for the Howard government. Indeed, during the Bush 
administrations, US policy towards China was somewhat at odds with 
Australia’s, revealing some cracks in the otherwise near perfect relationship. 
During the Bush years the US moved towards a more hard-line approach to 
China and in the process tried to get some of its traditional Asian allies on 
board, including Australia and Japan (and later India) (Vaughn, 2008: 17).  
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3.3. Australia and Japan: ‘Friend of a friend’ 
 
On Howard’s watch Australia also moved towards closer relations with Japan. 
Despite a history of hostility26 as well as many years of “accumulated 
indifference” (Leaver, 2006: 123), Canberra’s trade relationship with Tokyo 
thrived and, given Japan’s post-world war II constitutional and political 
constraints, for decades trade was indeed the cornerstone of the 
relationship. However, along with its reinforced partnership with Washington, 
Canberra also sought, and was drawn into, deeper relations with Tokyo. This 
is perhaps most clear is the institutionalization of the Trilateral Security 
Dialogue (2002) linking the US, Japan, and Australia. The initiative was 
originally meant to improve security collaboration among the three parties, 
especially around the issues of the war on terror, the Korean peninsula, and 
China’s rise (Vaughn, 2008: 8). Significantly, in 2005 it was upgraded to 
ministerial level and enlarged its agenda (ibid.). Later, in 2007 Australia and 
Japan signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, which essentially 
consolidated Canberra security links with Tokyo (Forrest, 2008: 43). 
Crucially, enhanced relations with Japan, particularly in such a sensitive area, 
developed in tandem with an “accelerated drift from pacifism to activism in 
                                                            
26 During the Pacific war, Japan had attacked and invaded Australia through the 
northernmost city of Darwin. Australia also fought Japan in neighbouring East Timor during 
world war II.   
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Japan’s national defense and security policy” (ibid.: 44), a progress made 
easier by the US-led global war on terror.  
 
Considering North Asia’s history of conflict as well as recent animosities, 
these strategic alignments reverberated negatively in the region. In particular 
they raised suspicion from China, where they were perceived as a form of 
containment - a group of countries partnering up to covertly check and 
balance alleged Chinese expansionism. Canberra’s enhanced collaboration 
with Tokyo also suggested support for Japan’s political ‘normalization’.   
 
Increasingly, then, Australia saw itself between a rock and a hard place: 
while having to live up to the expectations implicit in the ANZUS treaty and 
its post-9/11 foreign policy ‘fusion’ with the US, it also did not want to 
undermine its recent achievements with China. On the one hand, it was 
officially assumed that “[Australia] would want to avoid the emergence in the 
Asia-Pacific region of a security environment dominated by any powers 
whose strategic interests might be inimical to Australia’s and to avoid 
destabilizing competition between the region’s major powers” (DoD, 2000: 
X), a guideline where China seems to fit particularly well. On the other, a 
number of incidents blatantly contradicted this overall policy prescription. 
Perhaps most significant amongst them is Downer’s (in)famous comments on 
how Australia would react in the event of open cross-strait confrontation (the 
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lingering issue opposing China and Taiwan): having consistently supported 
the one-China policy, would Canberra side with Washington (who would 
support Taiwan), would it side with Beijing, or would it remain neutral (if at 
all possible)? And how would the ANZUS alliance come in the equation? 
When confronted with this scenario, Downer described the ANZUS treaty as 
symbolic, suggesting that no mutual defense obligation would apply in such 
circumstances (Malik, 2007: 592). This of course did not go over well with 
his American counterparts (ibid.). He also emphasized that neither ANZUS 
nor the Trilateral Security Dialogue were in any way directed at China. At the 
same time, while Beijing’s mounting and undisclosed military spending came 
under Washington’s criticism for “[threatening] the delicate security balance 
in Asia” (Rumsfeld dixit), Canberra took the view that China’s militarization 
was “a process of modernization, not destabilization” (Dibb, 2005: 16). Thus, 
there seemed to be conflicting viewpoints on China’s rise, an issue which had 
the potential to “[drive] a wedge between Washington and Canberra” 
(Malick, 2007: 587).  
 
 
Australia’s overall approach towards China drew accusations of complacency 
and suggestions that Canberra had gone soft on communist China (ibid.). 
But Howard-Downer did not see it that way. Faced with this predicament, 
Australia essentially took the ‘great leap forward’. In managing the push-pull 
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factors of both relationships, the official position revolved around rejection, 
denial, and arbitration. First, rejecting the assumption that China’s rise would 
inevitably lead to future confrontation with the US; in Howard’s own words 
‘”Australia does not believe that there is anything inevitable about escalating 
strategic competition between China and the US” (2005: 15)27. It follows that 
Australia also rejected any inexorable clash between Washington and Beijing 
over Taiwan (Malick, 2007: 590). At the same time, Australia’s ‘China 
dilemma’ had larger implications; it was an instructive case in point for John 
Howard’s attempt to rise above what he saw as constricting 
conceptualizations of Australia’s past. In this respect, the US vs. China 
problem resonated with the history vs. geography dilemma (see 
Introduction). Howard’s response was essentially to deny the idea that ‘more 
US’ necessarily means ‘less Asia’28 and to frame Australia’s relationship 
management as a mutually reinforcing achievement which underlined its 
“strategic maturity as a nation” (ibid.: 13). At the same time, taking 
advantage of Australia’s ‘in-betweenness’, Howard-Downer chose to position 
Australia as the natural mediator of that difficult relationship (ibid: 15), with 
a “major stake and supportive role to play” in its successful management 
(DFAT, 2003: 22, 79-80).  
 
                                                            
27 It also did not seem to believe China’s progress to be significant and sustainable enough 
to “be able to challenge the United State’s overall capacity to shape the global environment” 
(see DFAT, 2003: 21).  
28 He said “Time has only strengthened my conviction that we do not face a choice between 
our history and our geography” (2005: 3).  
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All in all, Australia’s ‘China dilemma’ is a classic example of how East Asian 
middle powers have been struggling to balance their economic and security 
interests in a context where the “economic and security anchors of the 
region increasingly divide between Beijing and Washington” (Ikenberry, 2004 
apud Taylor, 2007: 40). We have seen how Australia tried to escape this 
predicament: by siding with the US while at the same time claiming “a more 
independent discretion for [its] China policy” (Kelly, 2006: 69). In this 
respect the fact that Chinese president Hu Jintao addressed Australia’s 
parliament only one day after George W. Bush had done so was an 
accomplishment for which Howard took great pride. Australia’s management 
of these critical relationships was framed as a result of Howard-Downer’s 
diplomatic skills and foresight, as Australia was now “enjoying successful ties 
with the two nations likely to dominate the next century” (ibid.: 68), a feat 
few could claim. But with what we now know, Howard’s balancing act seems 
to be no more than an intermission29.   
                                                            
29 China featured prominently in the 2009 defense white paper, under prime minister Kevin 
Rudd’s leadership, as the main potential threat to Australia’s security (economic and 
defense-wise).  
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3.4. Conclusions 
 
What should we make of these moves? A typical appraisal of Australia’s 
assimilation with the America tends to fall into one of two categories. The 
first, which I shall call the ‘infatuation’ thesis, draws on unit-level attributes 
to account for the merger. This argument focuses specifically on the role of 
political agents – how their personal beliefs contribute to a particular foreign 
policy outcome. It posits that the special relationship with the US – from 
where everything else seems to flow - was only marginally strategically-
motivated, resulting instead from a particular idealized vision of the US and 
the unique strengths of its society. Such was Howard’s faith in America’s 
enduring power that he conceived of Australia’s future relationship with the 
US in terms of integration: strategic, economic, social and cultural integration 
with “the most formidable empire the world has ever seen, the new 
hegemon, the world’s first ‘hyper-power’” (Manne, 2006: n/a). As a result, 
Australia increasingly embarked on “a kind of foreign policy course of 
mimicry or, better still, of automaticity” (ibid.), which resulted in strained ties 
with some of its Asian neighbors, including China. According to this view, the 
quest for closer ties with the US – and Japan by extension - and the parallel 
gradual estrangement from China are best understood in the framework of 
Howard’s “romantic attachment to American civilisation and [his] vision of 
Australia’s future as ally of the great American [e]mpire” (ibid.).  
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The infatuation thesis has its merits. A brief review of Howard’s main 
pronouncements on Canberra-Washington relations does indeed suggest a 
kind of mythical vision of the US, promoting the idea of deeper integration 
with the US as a win-win deal. However, we have already seen how the 
relationship was also in some respects fundamentally unbalanced. 
 
While not rejecting this argument altogether, the prevailing view, which I 
shall call the ‘downpayment’ thesis, suggests that strategic factors played a 
much greater role in the decision to move closer with the US. According to 
this view, Howard’s attempt to reinvigorate the US alliance along with his 
loyal support for Bush’s policies, even the ill-conceived, were intended as an 
insurance policy – an advance payment meant to ensure US support (read: 
protection) in times of need; in essence, a constant and reliable security 
guarantee. This was an interesting and intriguing option in view of the ample 
recognition that “the chances of an attack on Australia remain[ed] low”30 
(DoD, 2000: 23).   
 
                                                            
30 The 2000 defence white paper envisages three scenarios: a full-scale invasion, a major 
attack, and minor attacks. The first is considered least likely, the second remotely possible, 
and the last possible (2000: 23).  
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Both arguments have different theoretical implications. The first privileges 
the role of human agency, underlining Cabinet’s takeover of traditional 
DFAT’s responsibilities and its consequences in terms of foreign policy 
formulation - to what extent did the latter reflect personal preferences and 
convictions. The second sees Canberra’s bandwagoning with Washington as 
a natural consequence of the external setting – the result of strategic 
variables beyond Australia’s control which induced that particular kind of 
behavior.  
 
I suggest that the second explanation is more consistent with (a) Australia’s 
past performance and with (b) the external environment at the time. 
Australia’s integration with the US during the Howard years should not be 
reduced (solely) to a matter of transient personal and political soulmateship: 
two leaders taking a liking for each other. Instead, it was the product of a 
rational decision grounded on Australia’s history and the larger geopolitical 
context.  
 
On the one hand, alignment with the US clearly resonates with the tradition 
of relying on ‘great and powerful friends’ as protectors of last resort: Great 
Britain up until world war II and the US/ANZUS thereafter. This is why, 
throughout the twentieth century, Australia’s defence forces have often 
served in out-of-area operations, in regions/conflicts where Australia’s stake 
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is not immediately clear: the willingness to fight ‘other peoples’ wars’ is part 
of the broader insurance policy (Koo, 2005: n/a). Here is how one analyst 
captured this trend: 
 
Australia’s defence policy consists primarily of sending Australian troops to every 
American war, in the hope that if one day Australia needs to have the favour 
returned, Americans will feel grateful enough to come and help. If the United States 
invaded Mars, Australia would send a battalion along. (Dyner apud Manne, 2006: n/a)  
 
Irony aside, this quote aptly illustrates the general perception of the 
Australia-US relationship. At the root of the insurance policy lies what one 
author has called Australia’s congenital ‘invasion anxiety’ (Burke, 2001) or its 
longstanding “existential fear of being overwhelmed by Asia” (Vaughn, 2008: 
13). This in turn derives from the circumstances of Australia’s inception as a 
predominantly Anglo-Saxon country surrounded by ‘hordes of aliens’ - a 
mindset which has evolved and continued in modern times - as well by 
geographic constraints which have instilled a sense of permanent ‘in-
betweenness’.  
 
We have noted earlier how it was exactly this kind of either/or identity 
problem that John Howard tried to overcome by deriding the ‘black armband 
discourse’ and reframing traditional weaknesses as strengths. His view was 
that Australia need not choose: it need not concede either to one side 
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(Asia/location) or the other (US, UK, Europe/culture); it should just be itself 
in Asia. It is therefore somewhat ironic that, even as he actively pursued this 
vision, Australia’s alignment with the US suggested the opposite: a kind of 
foreign policy increasingly based on cultural affinities. It may well be that 
while trying to rise above these binary divisions Howard did just the 
opposite, especially in terms of perception and image-building, providing 
Australia with its very own culturally-based security dilemma.   
 
But external factors were also important, if not decisive, in determining the 
course of Australia’s foreign policy towards North Asia, which both reflected 
and sustained traditional security concerns. Even though Howard saw himself 
as a practitioner, decried analytical theory and consistently dismissed any of 
the above mentioned binary conceptualizations of Australia’s place in the 
world31 (Kelly, 2006), it is possible to draw some parallels between ‘words 
and actions’ and theoretical insights. After all, ‘no state is an island’. 
 
First, on Howard’s watch we witnessed a full-fledged resurgence of the state 
as the primary political interface, both at the rhetorical and implementation 
levels, the ideal model being the state-as-deliverer: strong, delivering states 
                                                            
31 In addition to the history vs. geography or culture vs. location dilemma, Howard also 
spoke out against any need to choose between Asia and America, past and present, and 
global and regional strategies, promoting the idea that rather than mutually exclusive these 
dimensions were mutually reinforcing if managed well (DFAT, 2003; Howard, 2005).  
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in the ‘region to the north’ and weak, failing states in Australia’s vicinity, 
unable to get by without its support. In the latter case, the modern version 
of warfare merely reinforced the state’s centrality; the state was both the 
problem and the solution.  
 
At the same time, Howard-Downer reconsidered Australia’s approach 
towards international cooperation. Rather than building on Keating-Evan’s 
achievements in Asia, Howard-Downer rejected their predecessors brand of 
engagement which purportedly involved adjusting Australia’s identity to meet 
Asian standards, thereby positioning Australia as a supplicant rather than an 
equal partner among its Asian counterparts (Kelly, 2006: 28). On this basis, 
Howard-Downer’s starting point was that Australia’s foreign policy should not 
be based on idealistic aspirations (or any Self or Other transformational will) 
but on a realistic assessment of the Asia-Pacific power structures (Downer, 
2000a). In other words, Australia should come to terms with the fact that it 
was not, and never would be, part of the club and proceed on that basis.  
 
This kind of reasoning underpinned Australia’s interactions with the ‘region to 
the north’, particularly within the US-Japan-China circle. Because “Australia’s 
focus was on practical outcomes of relations between countries rather than 
just forms and processes” (Howard, 2005: 16, emphasis added), on 
Howard’s watch Australia was less forceful in its attempt to join the evolving 
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East Asian institutional architecture. This was partly due to a new foreign 
policy direction (closer ties with the US) but also the result of a tradition of 
membership denial32. Indeed, despite its efforts to integrate the region’s 
emergent institutional structures, Australia’s contribution had often been 
rejected. Against this background, it is not surprising that Howard-Downer 
chose to prioritize pragmatism over principle and results over process, even if 
officially trying to balance these out (Howard, 2005: 11). Indeed, during the 
Howard years Australia’s cooperation pattern turned increasingly selective, 
leading to defection from or indifference towards major international treaties 
as well as an implicit preference for relative over absolute gains, as 
evidenced by its dyadic relationship management.  
 
The priority accorded to the US alliance as well as Australia’s participation in 
the Trilateral Security Dialogue (to the detriment of its relationship with 
China) seem to follow logically from these external constraints. Despite 
Australia’s reluctance to admit to it, the enhanced trilateral security 
cooperation did increasingly conform with a form of balancing or hedging 
against the possibility of a future China threat (Tow, 2003: 15; Taylor, 2007). 
Given Howard’s refusal to choose, this was always an uneasy fit for Australia.  
 
                                                            
32 Most notably its exclusion from the ASEAN and ASEAN+3 regional fora. Another often 
cited example is Australia’s long running feud with Malaysia’s prime minister Mahathir bin 
Mohamad, who consistently and admittedly vetoed Australia’s ASEAN membership on 
cultural grounds. Australia is, however, a founding member of APEC and the ARF.   
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On the whole, then, Australia’s foreign policy under Howard-Downer broadly 
reflected traditional realist tenets, thereby confirming the ongoing relevance 
of its central assumptions. There is, however, an important difference that 
may feed into the theory: the claim that the root of Australia’s global 
engagement is to be found in its domestic foundations (Howard, 2005: 6) or, 
in other words, the erosion of the domestic vs. foreign policy distinction, with 
the former directly informing the latter. This was indeed a recurring theme 
for Howard, who seemingly drew on the character of the Australian people33 
and the strength of its institutions34 for inspiration: “In uncertain times, we 
should take heart from how democracies can find renewed power and 
purpose abroad from institutions and instincts at home” (ibid.: 6). Rhetoric 
aside, there are numerous cases of ‘crossovers’ during the Howard years. 
Particularly relevant to this thesis was how identity issues were allowed, even 
encouraged, to influence the foreign policy arena. For realists smart, rational 
states intent on maximizing gains and minimizing losses, will base decisions 
on strictly external factors for fear of ‘falling by the wayside’ (Waltz apud 
Schouten, 2009: 5). However, the Australian example suggests that the 
interplay between domestic and foreign policy can be both rational and 
mutually reinforcing.  
 
                                                            
33 ‘Australians have a reputation for hard work, directness and adaptability’ (Howard: 2005: 
4).  
34 ‘We have adapted to our distinctive setting the great bulwarks of liberal democracy (…)’ 
(ibid.).  
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Part 4: Final remarks 
 
This thesis addressed two traditionally important areas in Australian foreign 
policy. First, it tried to understand why Australia went from a distinctly 
hands-off approach to a remarkably interventionist stance in the Pacific in 
little over six months. It argued that Australia’s sea change resulted from an 
objective deterioration of the political and economic conditions in its 
neighbouring countries but was also largely enabled by a new external 
environment conducive to statebuilding interventions. Because of how global 
and regional dynamics intersected ‘on the way to Honiara/Dili’, the South 
Pacific is a microcosmos of the larger trends currently affecting the 
traditional state system. In fact, despite (or because of) its peripheral status 
it has been at the forefront of radical, yet discrete, governance 
experimentations, with RAMSI as a major case in point.  
 
Through an exhaustive confrontation of the official motivations for 
intervention and its operationalization, this thesis offered a critical analysis of 
Australia’s interventions in the Solomon Islands and in East Timor. Informed 
by Duffield’s critique of the security-development nexus, it put forth that 
Canberra’s interventions are a classic example of the post-9/11 inseparable 
linkage between homeland security and ‘buitenland’ security. Statebuilding 
interventions are premised on this argument. Thus, we have seen in some 
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detail how the primary motivations for intervention in the Solomons and in 
East Timor related to Australia first and foremost, and to a lesser degree to 
the populations affected. Specifically I have argued that Australia’s 
interventionism is a form of risk management; literally a technique to 
manage the risks for Australia that could arise from any one of those states 
‘failing’. Under the umbrella of the security-development nexus, Australia’s 
interventions can ultimately be traced to a different perception of threat – 
the idea that in the 21st century threats come primarily from intra- and non-
state entities.  
 
Unsurprisingly Australia’s approach to the Asia-Pacific stand in contrast to 
that towards the Pacific. From the analysis of Canberra’s relationships with 
Washington, Beijing and Tokyo we can draw a picture of a divided country, 
struggling to please its last-resort security guarantor and its newfound 
source of prosperity. While Howard did attempt the ‘ultimate synthesis’, it is 
questionable whether that same strategy may not have inadvertently 
backfired; certainly it did not last long. Under Howard’s leadership Australia 
essentially returned to a defensive pattern of relations with Asia, based on 
assumptions very dear to the realist tradition in international relations. A 
combination of subjective factors like the circumstances of its inception and 
its ambiguous identity and external conditions such as a tradition of exclusion 
from Asian regional fora and the Northeast Asian power politics dynamics, 
have consistently determined Australia’s positioning in Asia to the point that, 
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unless there are significant improvements in the region’s architecture, 
Australia will in all likelihood remain a congenitally anxious nation.  
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Attachment 1 – A quick guide to Australian politics 
 
Year 
Political 
party 
Political 
wing 
PM FM 
Foreign policy 
orientation 
1983 
ALP 
centre- 
left 
 
social- 
democrat 
Bob 
Hawke 
Bill 
Hayden 
idealism 
 
internationalism 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Gareth 
Evans 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Paul 
Keating 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
LPA 
centre- 
right 
 
liberal- 
conservative 
ideology 
John 
Howard 
Alexander 
Downer 
realism 
 
pragmatism 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
- 
ALP As above 
Kevin 
Rudd 
Stephen 
Smith 
- 
 
PM – Prime minister 
FAM – Foreign affairs minister 
ALP – Australian Labor Party 
LPA – Liberal Party of Australia 
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Attachment 2 – Map no. 1: The Pacific region 
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Attachment 3 - Map no. 2: The world from the Australian 
perspective 
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Attachment 4 – Map no. 3: The Australian ‘arc of instability’ 
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Attachment 5 – Map no. 4: Solomon Islands  
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